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Abstract 
Impulsivity was examined in a subclinical sample of college students with borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) traits .  Using the Borderline Personality Questionnaire (BPQ; Poreh et al. ,  2006) 
participants were screened for high and low BPD traits. Twenty-six high-BPD and twenty-four 
low-BPD participants were compared on impulsivity. Impulsivity was assessed using a self­
report measure (BIS- 1 1 ;  Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1 995) and three laboratory tasks, the Go Stop 
Impulsivity Paradigm (Dougherty, Mathias, & Marsh, 2003 ), a delay discounting task (Dixon, 
Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006) with monetary incentives and a delay discounting task with social 
incentives. Past research has shown that high- and low-BPD individuals do not discount 
monetary rewards differently (Dom, De Wilde, Hulstijn, Van Den Brink, & Sabbe, 2006). The 
present study replicated these results. In addition, the present research hypothesized that high­
BPD individuals would discount social rewards more steeply. Results, however, showed no 
differences between groups in social discounting, nor did high-BPD individuals discount social 
rewards at a significantly greater rate than monetary rewards, as was expected. Still, there was a 
significant main effect, showing that, overall, participants discounted social rewards more 
steeply than monetary rewards.  Contrary to what was expected, there was no difference between 
groups on the Go Stop Impulsivity Paradigm. Results did confirm the hypothesis that high-BPD 
participants were more impulsive than low-BPD participants on the BIS- 1 1 .  These results 
suggest that the two groups differ on impulsivity according to self-report measures, but that 
delay discounting does not discriminate between groups regardless of the reinforcer. 
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Impulsivity in Subclinical Borderline Personality Individuals Using a Delay Discounting Task 
with Social Incentives 
The nature ofborderline personality disorder (BPD) is one of immense instability across 
a variety of areas of functioning, including interpersonal relationships and impulsivity. The 
prevalence ofBPD is about 1 -2% of the general population and can be very debilitating both to 
those inflicted with it, and to those who care for them (Samuels et al., 2002; Swartz, Blazer, 
George, & Winfield, 1990; Torgersen, Kringlen, & Cramer, 2001 ). In psychiatric populations, 
the prevalence greatly increases, with individuals with borderline personality disorder making up 
to 8- 1 0% of the outpatient population and 1 5-20% of the inpatient psychiatric community. 
Those with BPD require more mental health resources than those with different psychiatric 
disorders which makes gaining understanding about the nature of the disorder that much more 
imperative (Lieb, Zanarini, Schmahl, Linehan, & Bohus, 2004; Widiger & Trull, 1 993 ; Widiger 
& Weissman, 1 99 1 ;  Zimmerman, Rothschild, & Chelminski, 2005). BPD diagnoses are 
strikingly disparate between genders, with women making up about 70% of cases (Swartz et al. ,  
1 990; Widiger & Weissman, 1 991; Zanarini, Gunderson, Frankenburg, & Chauncey, 1 990b) . 
Borderline personality disorder, along with all other personality disorders, is an axis II 
disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV-TR (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Within axis II, the personality disorders are organized into three 
separate clusters. Cluster A disorders, also known as "odd-eccentric" disorders, include 
paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal personality disorders. Borderline personality disorder falls 
under Cluster B, or "dramatic-emotional" disorders, as does antisocial, histrionic and narcissistic 
personality disorders. Lastly, the "anxious-fearful" disorders in Cluster C are avoidant, 
dependent and obsessive-compulsive personality disorders. It is not uncommon for individuals 
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to have more than one axis II disorder (Ross, Dermatis, Levounis, & Galanter, 2003). In 
addition, personality disorders such as BPD are commonly comorbid with a variety of axis I 
disorders, such as mood disorders, specifically major depression and bipolar disorder (Altindag, 
Yanik, & Nebioglu, 2006; Tamam, Ozpoyraz, & Karatas, 2004; Zanarini et al. , 1 998b), 
substance abuse disorders (Skinstad & Swain, 200 1 ;  Zanarini et al. ,  1 998b ), anxiety disorders, 
specifically post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Golier et al. ,  2003 ; Zanarini et al. ,  1 998b ), 
eating disorders (Zanarini et al. ,  1 998b), and even body dysmorphic disorder (Semiz et al., 
2008).  
Borderline personality disorder is  defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders-IV-TR as "a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self 
image, and affects, and marked impulsivity" (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 706). 
A person diagnosed with BPD can be happy one minute, and in total despair the next; they may 
"alternate between being flooded with emotion and being numb to all feeling" (Moskovitz, 
2001 ) . Those with BPD experience intense bouts of rage, which can either be directed at others, 
or turned inwards on themselves in the form of self-harm or suicidal gestures or attempts. They 
may also turn to self-destructive and "impulsive" behaviors to sooth their pain, such as using 
alcohol and drugs, binge eating, reckless spending or promiscuity (Dougherty, Bjork, Huckabee, 
Moeller, & Swann, 1 999; Moskovitz, 200 1 ). They have unstable and intense relationships, as 
they fear abandonment from others but often push those who care away with mistrust, hostility 
and degradation. 
Despite frequent comorbidity of BPD with axis I and other axis II disorders, BPD does 
have discriminating features. The central distinct features ofBPD are affective disturbance, 
cognitive disturbance, impulsivity, and unstable relationships. Taken together, these salient 
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features make up BPD (Lieb et al., 2004) and differentiate it from axis I disorders and other axis 
II disorders (Fossati, et al. ,  2007; Gunderson & Kolb, 1 978 ; Zanarini et al., 1 990b). 
Central Features of BPD 
Affective Disturbance in BPD 
Those suffering from BPD experience intense and rapidly changing affective states, often 
negative in nature, such as rage, sorrow, panic, emptiness, a!l<i shame (Lieb et al., 2004). People 
with BPD live with "intense inner pain . .. on a chronic basis," (Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2007, p. 
522). Not only do patients diagnosed with BPD experience these negative emotions, but they 
seem to do so to a greater degree than do other patients, leading some to refer to their 
dysregulation as hyperbolic, or exaggerated (Zanarini & Frankenburg, 1 994; Zanarini et al. ,  
1 998a) .  Zanarini and Frankenburg (2007) explain that hyperbolic temperament in regards to 
BPD is meant to describe the tendency to be offended easily and to try to manage the resulting 
resentment by "persistently insisting that others pay attention to the enormity of one's inner 
resulting in immense torment from "even the slightest touch or movement," (p. 69) . Feelings of 
depression, dysphoria, anger and anxiety are more common in those with BPD than those with 
other axis II disorders (Zanarini et al. ,  1 990b ). They attempt to ameliorate and deal v1ith this 
inner pain in a variety of ways, which are mostly self-destructive or inappropriate in nature, 
including uncontrolled bouts of anger, fighting and self-hann(Lieb et al . ,  2004; Linehan, 1 993; 
Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2007). 
In a study by Zanarini et al. ( 1 99�a), patients with a BPD diagnosis and a control group 
of patients without a BPD diagnosis were given the Dysphoric Affect Scale (DAS), a self-report 
measure designed by these researchers to assess dysphoric emotions and cognitions common to 
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BPD. Looking specifically at dysphoric states common to BPD but not exclusive or specific to 
BPD (meaning they were also common among clients with other diagnoses), the researchers 
found that clients with BPD reported significantly higher frequencies of all twenty five states 
than did the control group. Affective states in the DAS included unhappy, scared, lonely, empty, 
hurt, worthless, desperate, and very angry inside. These affect disturbances and extreme 
fluctuations in mood exacerbate the other symptoms ofBPD. 
Cognitive Disturbance in BPD 
Another area in which those with BPD suffer symptoms is their cognitions. The 
cognitive disturbances individuals with BPD experience are mainly non-psychotic but delusional 
and disturbing thoughts. Often, these symptoms occur during times of extreme stress triggered 
by real or imagined abandonment. They are mostly paranoid type thoughts or dissociation but do 
not last long enough to warrant any kind of additional diagnosis (American Psychological 
Association, 2000). Zanarini, Gunderson, and Frankenburg ( 1 990a) outlined three levels of these 
symptoms: disturbed thought, quasi-psychotic thought, and true psychotic thought. Quasi­
psychotic thoughts are atypical hallucinations or delusions which are either partially based on 
reality or totally fantastical; they last less than two days, and involve only one or two areas of the 
patient's life (Zanarini et al. ,  1 990b). 
Zanarini et al. ( 1 990a) found that 1 00% borderline participants reported some kind of 
disturbing, but non-psychotic, thoughts such as nondelusional paranoia, undue suspiciousness, or 
unusual perceptions. About 40% ofBPD individuals reported quasi-psychotic thought (26% 
quasi-psychotic hallucinations, 20% quasi-psychotic delusions). Similarly, in another study 
Zanarini et al. ( 1 990b) found that 3 5% ofBPD patients reported quasi-psychotic thought, 7 1% 
reported odd thinking, and 93% reported nondelusional paranoia. Individuals diagnosed with 
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BPD have cognitive distortions that often center on a persistent negative and intensely unstable 
sense of self, frequently including thoughts of being bad. They can also experience dissociative 
and depersonalization symptoms (Zanarini et al. , 1990a). The DSM-IV-TR defines dissociative 
symptoms as "a disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, 
identity, or perception of the environment" (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 5 1 9) .  In 
layman' s terms, the extreme physical and emotional detachment of dissociation in BPD has been 
described as "numbing out," "shutting down" or "go[ing] away" (Moskovitz, 200 1 ,  p. 2 1 ). 
As previously mentioned, Zanarini et al. ( 1998a) assessed dysphoric cognitions among 
BPD patients using the DAS. As was found with affective symptoms, the researchers found that 
the BPD group reported significantly more dysphoric cognitions than control patients without 
BPD; disturbed cognitions included thoughts such as "I'm misunderstood," "I'm a complete 
fai lure," "I'm a bad person," "The pain will never go away," and "No one cares about me," (p. 
203) .  Combined with the emotional turbulence, these skewed cognitions make both living with 
BPD and treating it arduous. 
Interpersonal Relationships & Fear of Abandonment in BPD 
Those diagnosed with borderline personality disorder are notorious for simultaneously 
striving toward and repelling against relationships with others. They are quick to dive into 
intense relationships in which they idealize the individual, but can become disenchanted with 
that same person just as hastily. They have intense fear of abandonment and often make frantic 
efforts to avoid being left alone, yet they can be very demanding and devaluing of others 
especially when they feel abandoned or expect they may be left alone (American Psychological 
Association, 2000; Lieb et al. ,  2004; Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2007). 
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Intolerance ofbeing alone is  a key facet of the disorder and understanding this is 
imperative to successfully treating BPD (Gunderson, 1 996) .  This need to be with others and to 
feel validated leads to long and frequent hospital stays as well as extensive dependence on 
outpatient therapists (Geller & Brandzel, 1983 ;  Gunderson, 1996). One case study described a 
twenty-three year old woman diagnosed 'with BPD who had been admitted to the same inpatient 
facility sixteen times since the age of eighteen, as well as two admissions to other facilities 
(Geller & Brandzel, 1 983) .  Often times, her admissions were due to her own insistence that only 
an admission would prevent her suicide; continuous staff surveillance was frequently necessary 
to prevent any suicidal gestures. 
Difficulties with interpersonal relationships tend to begin early and may stem from 
difficulties in childhood for those with BPD. Mizenberg, Poole, and Vinogradov, (2006) found 
that people with BPD have two types of social attachment: attachment-anxiety and attachment­
avoidance. Attachment-anxiety is related the fear of abandonment in relationship settings, while 
attachment-avoidance is related to social distancing, both emotionally and behaviorally; these 
two styles together represent the paradoxical style of interacting in those with BPD. 
Maltreatment and abuse in childhood may play a role in the interpersonal problems that 
are evident in adulthood. Mizenberg et al. (2006) also found that attachment difficulties in 
adulthood were related to reports of childhood sexual abuse and maltreatment. In another study 
by Wonderlich and Swift ( 1989), seventy-two percent of participants with BPD reported sexual 
abuse during adolescence, which was significantly higher than those with other personality 
disorders (twenty-seven percent) or no personality disorder. In the same study, BPD clients 
reported more hostile and emotionally impoverished family environments than did those with 
other personality disorders. 
7 
This perception of others as being hostile or withdrawn from oneself is pervasive among 
individuals diagnosed with BPD. They are more likely than mood disordered individuals to view 
their current relationships as hostile, their maternal relationships as "highly autonomous," and to 
perceive themselves as "hostilely recoiled from staff and attacked by other patients" (Benjamin 
& Wonderlich, 1 994, p. 6 1 8). Similarly, Wonderlich and Swift ( 1989) found that people with 
BPD were more likely than those with other personality disorders to perceive their relationships 
with both parents as hostile and withdrawn. Patients with BPD seem to have a "deeply held 
belief that other people are uncaring or malevolent" and constantly feel rejected, yet they keep 
hoping and yearning for close and meaningful relationships (Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2007, p. 
528). This fear of abandonment may be part of what fuels their impulsive behavior in that 
dangerous behaviors and gestures can elicit help and attention from others, which might also lead 
to alleviation of their emotional pain (Linehan, 1 993) .  
Impulsivity in BPD 
In addition to their unstable relationships with family, friends, romantic partners and 
mental health professionals, individuals with BPD often exhibit impulsive behavior. Impulsive 
and destructive behaviors such as self harm, suicidal gestures, sexual promiscuity and substance 
abuse are common in the BPD population (Feske, Tarter, Kirisci, & Pilkonis, 2006; Zanarini & 
Frankenburg, 2007) . Impulsiveness is a key characteristic ofBPD in that it discriminates BPD 
from all other Cluster B disorders (Fossati et al. , 2007). 
Though impulsive behaviors (such as binge drinking and eating, reckless spending and 
promiscuity) are diagnostically separated from self-harm and suicidal behavior in the DSM-IV­
TR criteria, impulsivity in the form self-injurious and suicidal behavior is extremely common in 
BPD (American Psychological Association, 2000). Research has shown that clients with BPD 
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report engaging in self-harm behavior during adolescence more than those diagnosed with other 
personality disorders or those without any personality disorder (Wonderlich & Swift, 1 989).  
Self-injurious behavior among borderline individuals is as prevalent as 65-75% (Levy, 2005;  
Zanarini et al. ,  2008).  Additionally, those with BPD commonly report making suicide attempts, 
more often than those with other personality disorders do, and much more than those with no 
personality disorder (Wonderlich & Swift, 1 989).  
Much research has highlighted the high risk of suicide and parasuicidal behavior among 
those with BPD (Levy, 2005;  Soloff & Fabio, 2008;  Zanarini et al . ,  2008; Zanarini et al. ,  1 990b) . 
Parasuicidal behavior, described by Norman Kreitman (as cited in Linehan, 1 993), is the 
preferred label for suicidal gestures or attempts and refers to any non-fatal but self-injurious 
behavior. This includes behavior that causes actual tissue damage, illness, or risk of death. 
Ingesting drugs in excess with the intent to cause harm or death also constitutes parasuicide, 
while mere threats of suicide without action are not considered parasuicide. Additionally, 
parasuicide is distinguished from actual suicide where death occurs. It has been estimated that 
the rate of successful suicides in the BPD population is as high as I 0%, which is 400 times 
greater than the general population (Levy, 2005 ; Fertuck, Makhija, & Stanley, 2007; Paris & 
Zweig-Frank, 200 1) .  One study found 60% of individuals diagnosed with reported making 
multiple suicide attempts, and 3 0% reported several methods of parasuicide (Zanarini et al. ,  
2008). 
The abandonment issues characteristic ofBPD likely play a role in the frequency of self­
injury and suicide. The anxious attachment style that is common in BPD is also correlated with 
self-harm behavior and may be a way to keep others close and rouse sympathy or rescue 
(Critchfield, Levy, Clarkin, & Kemberg, 2008). Brodsky, Malone, Ellis, Dulit, and Mann, 
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(1997) found that a history of childhood sexual or physical abuse was correlated with higher 
amounts of previous suicide attempts. Additionally, Brodsky et al. ( 1 997) reported that 
impulsivity was the only BPD characteristic that was associated with higher rates of suicide 
attempts and that treatment that targets impulsivity in individuals with BPD is therefore 
imperative to decrease suicide attempts and rates. To understand impulsivity among people with 
BPD, it is necessary to try to understand the nature of impulsivity itself, which can be convoluted 
and diverse. 
Impulsivity as a Construct 
Impulsivity as a construct is quite heterogeneous; the definition may be difficult to 
pinpoint exactly because it is so multifaceted. Though impulsivity is a crucial feature in many 
disorders described in the DSM-IV, including ADHD, antisocial personality, borderline 
personality, and "impulse-control" disorders such as kleptomania and pathological gambling, the 
manual provides no explicit definition of impulsivity (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) . 
Many attempts at defining impulsivity by others in the field have resulted in a variety of 
definitions. For example, choosing the lesser of two choices because of an inability to wait 
(Ainslie, 1975), inability to delay gratification (Mischel & Gilligan, 1964), "quick, unplanned 
behaviors that appear to lack clear forethought" (Hochhausen, Lorenz, & Newman, 2002, p .  
495), and the tendency to contemplate less than most people before taking action (Dickman, 
1 990) have all been used to describe impulsivity. 
Impulsivity can be viewed as a trait--a stable and long-lasting characteristic of a person, 
or as a state, such as behaving impulsively in a current situation. Research has distinguished 
between state and trait in regards to impulsivity (Benazzi, 2007; Baca-Garcia et aL, 2005) as well 
as anxiety (Gaudry, Vagg, & Spielberger, 1975;  Usala & Hertzog, 1991). Often self report 
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measures, such as the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), focus 
on trait impulsivity, while laboratory measures, such as the Immediate Memory-Delayed 
Memory tas� target state impulsiveness (Swann, Dougherty, Pazzaglia, Pham, & Moeller, 
2004).  There are, however, exceptions to this generalization (Guerrieri et al., 2007). 
The fact that impulsivity is  not a unified construct is  recognized by researchers who have 
attempted to better understand it by identifying separate aspects which are each a part of the 
overall construct. Eysenck and Eysenck broke down impulsiveness into four parts: risk-taking, 
non-planning, liveliness, and narrow impulsivity (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1977). Dickman (1990) 
also subdivided impulsiveness into two types, functional and dysfunctional. Functional 
impulsivity refers to making quick decisions when doing so is advantageous, while dysfunctional 
impulsivity refers to "speedy and non-reflective decision-making despite the negative 
consequences of such actions" (Dickman, 1990; Mobini, Grant, Kass, & Yeomans, 2007, p. 
1 5 1 8) .  
Other researchers have differentiated between wholly different kinds of impulsivity. 
Swann, Bjork, Moeller, and Dougherty (2002) identified two major models of impulsivity-­
inability to delay reward (reward-delay impulsivity), and inability to take environmental context 
into account when making decisions (rapid-response impulsivity). The researchers used different 
laboratory tests and a self-report measure to distinguish between the two and found that both 
types of impulsivity correlated with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Barratt, 1959). Rapid­
response impulsiveness, however, correlated more highly than reward-delay impulsiveness 
among axis II disordered parents of children with disruptive behavioral disorders (such as 
oppositional defiant disorder, conduct disorder and ADHD). 
1 1  
Dougherty, Marsh, Mathias, and Swann (2005) also split impulsiveness into separate 
subtypes, but rather than the two that Swann et al. (2002) previously identified, they created 
three categories. The first is response initiation, which defines impulsivity as quick and 
unplanned decision making, or responding before full evaluation of the stimuli has been 
completed. Response inhibition is the second aspect of impulsive behavior, which they defined 
as a failure to inhibit an already initiated response. Response initiation coupled with response 
inhibition is analogous to Swann et al. ' s  (2002) rapid-response impulsivity. Lastly, consequence 
sensitivity (analogous to reward-delay) refers to impulsive behavior that continues despite 
negative or less favorable consequences, such as a loss of a reward (Dougherty, Marsh et al. ,  
2005). 
There are numerous laboratory measures that have been employed to measure each aspect 
of impulsiveness indentified by Swann et al. (2002) and Dougherty, Marsh et al. (2005). Each 
measure coincides with a different aspect of impulsivity, either response initiation, response 
inhibition or consequence sensitivity/reward-delay . 
Laboratory Measures of Impulsivity 
Response Initiation 
The Immediate and Delayed Memory Task (IMTIDMT) .. 
The Immediate and Delayed Memory Tasks are variants of the Continuous Performance 
Test (CPT) (Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome, & Beck, 1956), which was originally created 
to test attention and alertness brain damaged individuals compared to non-brain damaged 
persons. In its original form, the CPT included two tasks, the X task and the more difficult AX 
task. During the X task, the individual looked into a man-made apparatus in which letters were 
illuminated by a light bulb; participants were to respond by pressing the response key when they 
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saw the letter X during the X task. The AX task required slightly more prolonged attention and 
required participants to respond when they saw an X followed by an A. Those with brain 
damage preformed more poorly on both tasks of the CPT (Rosvold et al. , 1 956). 
The Immediate Memory Task (IMT) and the Delayed Memory Task (DMT), though 
modifications of the CPT, are somewhat different from their predecessor. Both the IMT and 
DMT are used to measure attention, memory and impulsivity (Dougherty, Marsh, & Mathias, 
2002; Dougherty, Steinberg, Wassef, Medearis, Cherek, & Moeller, 1 998). IMT/DMT addresses 
the response initiation aspect of impulsivity, which is the part of impulsivity defined by 
responses that occur before full evaluation of the stimuli has been completed (Dougherty, Marsh 
et al. ,  2005). Both tasks are completed using a computer program which presents a series of 2 to 
7 digit numbers on a screen. 
The IMT displays each number, one at a time, for 5 00msec with a 500msec interval 
between each stimulus. Each number is displayed in black with a white background, and 
participants are to respond (by clicking the mouse) when the number shown is identical to the 
one immediately before it. The DMT component also uses a series of numbers and asks 
participants to identify identical stimuli, but the time delay between stimuli increases because 
distracter stimuli are presented in between the two stimuli to be compared; participants are 
instructed to ignore the distracter stimuli .  For example, a distracter number such as 1 2345 might 
be shown in between the two matching stimuli, looking something like this: 
59231 . . .  12345 . . .  1 2345 . . .  12345 . . .  5923 1 (Dougherty et al. ,  2002). 
For both the IMT and the DMT tasks, there are three different stimuli types that appear 
during the sessions: target, catch and filler. Target stimuli are those that are identical to the 
number set shown immediately before; a response to a target stimulus is considered a correct 
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detection, or a "hit."  Failure to respond to target stimulus is considered an omission error, or a 
"miss" (Dougherty et al. ,  1998). Target stimuli measure attention and memory abilities. 
The catch stimuli are of particular importance to research on impulsiveness. Catch 
stimuli are almost identical to the preceding number set, but differ by one digit. Responding to 
these stimuli is considered a commission error, or a "false alarm"� a high frequency of 
commission errors is thought to be indicative of impulsivity (Dougherty, Bjork, Marsh, & 
Moeller, 2000; Dougherty, Bjork, Huckabee, Moeller, & Swann, 1 999; Dougherty et al. ,  1 998). 
Filler stimuli are novel number sets that are not similar to the prior stimulus. Errors in 
responding to these fillers are considered filler errors. Such errors do not occur often (Dougherty 
et al. ,  2002). 
Response Inhibition 
Stop tasks. 
In general, all variations of stop tasks aim to measure the same thing--inhibitory control. 
Measures such as the GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm (Dougherty, Mathias et al. ,  2003; Marsh, 
Dougherty, Mathias, Moeller, & Hicks, 2002), the stop-signal paradigm (Logan & Cowan, 1984; 
Van der Schoot, Licht, Horsley, & Sergeant, 2003), Go/No-Go (Drewe, 1 975 ;  Kamarajan et al. ,  
2004), and the Passive Avoidance Learning task (Farmer et al. ,  2003), all aim to measure the 
response inhibition aspect of impulsivity, which is  defined by the inability to inhibit an already 
initiated response (Dougherty, Marsh et al. , 2005; Dougherty, Mathias, Marsh, & Jagar, 2005). 
In the Go Stop Impulsivity Paradigm, participants are shown a series of stimuli ( 5 digit 
numbers) in black with a white background on computer screen, and similar to the IMT/DMT, 
are asked to respond if the stimulus is identical to the one shown immediately before it 
(Dougherty, Mathias et aL, 2003; Dougherty, J'viathias et al., 2005; :tvfarsh et al. ,  2002). Half of 
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the stimuli are target stimuli (identical numbers) and half are filler, or non-matching, stimuli .  Of 
all the target stimuli, half of them are "stop" trials. This occurs when the set of numbers 
presented are identical to the previous stimuli, but the numbers change from black to red at some 
point after the onset of the stimulus; this indicates that the participant should then inhibit the 
already initiated response. Individuals are considered impulsive when they have trouble 
inhibiting responses once they have been initiated, operationally defined by the number of 
response inhibition failures relative to the number of responses to go trials (Dougherty, Bjork et 
al. ,  2003; Dougherty, Marsh-Richard, Hatzis, Nouvion, & Mathias, 2008; Dougherty, Mathias et 
al. ,  2005; Marsh et al., 2002). 
The stop-signal paradigm (Logan & Cowan, 1984), which originated before the GoStop 
Impulsivity Paradigm, similarly asks participants to respond to a stimulus unless they are given a 
stop signal to inhibit their response. In this case, the stop signal is  an auditory tone. There is a 
go task and stop task. The go task requires the participant to discriminate X and 0, and to press 
a different key on the keyboard depending on which letter they saw on the screen (for example, 
pressing the "f' key for an X and the "z" key for an 0) (Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997). 
Stop signals, a tone played through the speakers on the computer, are presented on 25% of the 
trials. Participants are told to inhibit their response to both stimuli if they hear a tone; the delay 
of the tone varies on each trial. Inhibitory control depends on a "race" between the stop task and 
the go task. If participants finish the stop task before the go task, they inhibit their response; if 
they finish the go task before the stop task, the response is not inhibited. Therefore, response 
inhibition depends on the latency of the response to the go signal (known as the go reaction time) 
and the latency of the response to the stop signal (stop-signal reaction time). Those who are 
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impulsive have longer stop-signal reaction times and therefore do not inhibit their responses 
(Logan et al. ,  1 997) .  
The Go/No-Go task (Dom et al. ,  2006) also asks participants to respond to specific 
stimuli unless given a signal to inhibit that response. Participants are told to move a yellow dot 
using an electronic pen into a target circle as fast as possible if the target circle is colored dark 
blue (go trial), but to inhibit that response if the target circle is colored light blue (no-go trial) . 
The number of errors in the no-go trials and reaction time in the go trials are dependent variables 
in this task (Dom et al. ,  2006). This task has also been done using circles presented at the top 
right and bottom left comers of a computer screen as the go signals and circles presented in the 
top left and bottom right corners as the stop signals (Kamarajan et al. ,  2004). 
The Passive Avoidance Learning Task (PAL) (Farmer et al. , 2003) was designed to be 
similar to the go/no-go task, and also measures the response inhibition aspect of impulsivity. It 
requires participants to respond to stimuli to acquire reward, as well inhibiting response to avoid 
punishment (Newman, 1 987; Newman & Kosson, 1 986). Participants are to respond to positive 
stimuli (S+), which are various sets of two-digit numbers displayed on a computer screen for up 
to 3 seconds, to earn a 1 0  cent monetary incentive. There are six sets of numbers that represent 
the S+ stimuli. Correctly responding to a S+ stimulus by pressing a key on the keyboard results 
in the word "Correct" being displayed on the computer screen, as well as the experimenter 
saying "correct" in neutral tone (Farmer et al., 2003). Other studies have displayed the words, 
"You WIN 1 0  cents!" along with a high pitched tone to signal correct responses (Chapman, 
Leung, & Lynch, 2008). Six other sets of numbers are negative stimuli (S-), which signal 
participants to inhibit their response; failure to do so results in the presentation of the word 
"Wrong" (or "You LOSE 1 0  cents") and the experimenter saying "wrong" (or a low pitched 
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sound), (Chapman et al. ,  2008; Farmer et al., 2003). Impulsivity is measured by the number of 
passive avoidance errors (P AEs ), incorrectly responding to S- stimuli. Omission Errors ( OEs ), a 
failure to response to S+ stimuli, are also measured (Chapman, Mayer, Specht, Farmer, & Field, 
2003; Chapman et al. , 2008; Farmer et al. ,  2003). 
Consequence Sensitivity/Reward-Delay 
Two-choice delayed reward. 
The two-choice delayed reward task, also called the two-choice reward task (Marsh et al. ,  
2002) and the two-choice impulsivity paradigm (TCIP) (Dougherty, Mathias et al. ,  2005), 
measures one's ability to wait for a delayed reward. Using a discrete trial procedure, the two­
choice delayed reward (TC) task requires participants to choose one of two shapes, or letters, 
each representing a different delay-reward contingency (Cherek & Lane, 1 999; Dougherty et al. ,  
2003; Marsh et al., 2002). Throughout a series of trials, the participant selects either the shape 
leading to a smaller reward (points) after a shorter delay, or a larger reward after a longer delay. 
Participants go through a practice session to ensure that they are exposed to the different 
monetary amounts and delays associated with each letter or shape. 
The type of reward contingency can either be fixed or variable. With a fixed 
contingency, for example, a participant can click either a circle to earn 5 cents after 5 seconds, or 
click on square to earn 1 5  cents after 1 5  seconds. In a variable contingency, however, the length 
of delay and amount of reward will change according to the participant' s prior response. For 
example, the length of delay may be increased for smaller reward after each time that choice 
is selected, therefore making the attractiveness of the sooner reward diminish. Variable 
contingencies are useful for determining the indifference point, or the point at which the shorter 
17 
and longer delayed reward are of equal value to the individual (Dougherty, Mathias et al. ,  2005). 
Indifference points are determined by an adjusting procedure developed by Mazur ( 1987) . 
Single Key Impulsivity Paradigm (SKIP). 
Similar to the TC, the Single Key Impulsivity Paradigm (SKIP) measures one's tolerance 
for a delayed reward (Mathias et al. ,  2002). The major difference between the TC and the SKIP 
is that the latter is a free-operant task as opposed to the discrete-trial procedure of the former. 
The SKIP allows the participant to respond freely by clicking the mouse, with the amount of the 
reward changing depending on the length of time the person waits between responses. The 
longer the participant waits between responses, the larger the reward becomes. Participants earn 
1 cent for every 2 seconds of waiting, so waiting 20 seconds will earn the participant 1 0  cents 
(Mathias et al. ,  2002). Throughout the 20 minute session, two money counters keep track of the 
individuals progress, one labeled, "Total Accumulated Money" and the other labeled "Most 
Recent Response Earnings. " This allows participants to infer the delay-reward relationship 
without being explicitly told that waiting longer results in more money earned (Dougherty et al. ,  
2003; Mathias et  al., 2002; Swann et  al. ,  2002). Participants are given the money they earn at the 
end of the SKIP task. 
Delay of gratification. 
The delay of gratification paradigm was created by Walter Mischel to study self-control 
and "resistance to temptation" in children (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1 972; Mischel & 
Gilligan, 1 964, p. 412) . The paradigm presents two tangible rewards to participants, one 
available immediately, and the other, though more desirable, available only after a delay. The 
immediately available reward (such as a toy or preferred food), is set in front of the individual. 
The experimenter explains to the child that he or she may have that item now, or wait until the 
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experimenter returns, at which point he or she will be given the more desirable reward. The 
ability to wait for the more desirable reward is considered impulse control (Mischel & Gilligan, 
1964). 
Self-control paradigm. 
Similar to the previously mentioned reward-delay impulsivity tasks, the self-control 
paradigm is used to study self control and its opposite, impulsiveness (Ainslie, 1974; Rachlin & 
Green, 1972). Self-control is defined by choosing a delayed reward of higher value over a 
reward of lesser value available immediately, while  impulsiveness is defined by the opposite 
pattern of decision making (Logue, 1998). An apparatus is used specifically for such tasks, 
which consists of a wooden box with three different colored light bulbs (green, white and red) 
which indic8;te the beginning and end of trials, one or two sterile aluminum straws (to obtain 
reinforcer) and an aluminum rod that participants push either left or right to indicate their choice. 
Participants can choose between a more immediate reward and a delayed more desirable reward, 
such as one kind of juice or their more preferred, delayed flavor of juice (Forzano & Logue, 
1995; Forzano, Porter, & Mitchell, 1997). Participants' sensitivity to reinforcer amount relative 
to delay is a measure of self-control. 
Delay discounting. 
Delay discounting is the phenomenon in which the value of reward (e.g. money) 
decreases, or is discounted, by delay (Mazur, 1987; Odum & Rainaud, 2003). This tendency to 
discount the value of the reward based on the length of delay has been found in both human and 
non-human subjects (Mazur, 1987; Odum & Rainaud, 2003; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; 
Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997). 
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The delay discounting procedure presents a series of choices to the participant, either 
using a computer program or index cards (Rachlin et al. ,  1991; Dixon, Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006). 
The participant chooses between a smaller, immediate hypothetical reward and a larger, but 
delayed hypothetical reward. For example, using the index card procedure, the amount of 
monetary incentives is as follows, $1,000, $990, $960, $920, $850, $800, $750, $700, $650, 
$600,$550,$500,$450,$400,$350,$300,$250,$200,$150,$100,$80,$60,$40,$20,$10,$5, 
and $1. Delays can range from 1 week, 2 weeks, 2 months, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years, and 25 
years (Rachlin et al. ,  1991; Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997). The individual is first 
asked to choose between $1,000 immediately and $1,000 after 1 week. The amount of the 
immediate reward is then adjusted or titrated (decreased to $990, $960 etc. )  until the indifference 
point is identified (the point at which the individual chooses the delayed reward instead of the 
immediate amount), which represents the point at which the amount of the immediate and 
delayed reward are subjectively equal (Mazur, 1987). This process is  repeated for each delay 
length. Steeper discounting is considered to be more impulsive. Delay discounting procedures 
are hypothetical in that participants are never actually given the reinforcement. 
Self Report Measures of Impulsivity 
The following measures are commonly used methods to assess impulsivity in a self report 
format . There are, however, many other self report measures used in research that will not be 
discussed here. 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
Originally created by Earnest Barratt in 1959, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scales is 
currently in its eleventh version (BIS- 1 1 ; Patton et al. , 1995). The BIS- 1 1 is a 30 item self-report 
questionnaire that assesses trait impulsivity and is the most used self-report measure of 
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impulsivity in both clinical and research settings (Stanford et al. ,  2009). The BIS- 1 1 measures 
three subtraits of impulsivity: Attentional Impulsiveness (an inability to focus or concentrate), 
Motor Impulsiveness (acting without thinking) and Non-Planning Impulsiveness (lack of 
"futuring" or forethought) (Patton et al., 1995). Scores of 72 or higher on the BIS- 11 are usually 
used to classify individuals as highly impulsive. Scores between 52 and 7 1  are within the normal 
range of impulsivity. Scores lower than 52 indicate either a person who is over-controlled or has 
not completed the questionnaire honestly (Stanford et al., 2009). 
Impulsiveness-Venturesomeness-Empathy Questionnaire 
The Impulsiveness-Venturesomeness-Empathy questionnaire (IVE-7) (Eysenck, Pearson, 
Basting & Allsopp, 1985) has its origins in Sybil Eysenck and H. Eysenck' s  theory of personality 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978) which identified three traits of personality: Psychoticism (P), 
Extraversion-Introversion (E) and Neuroticism (N). Those high in psychoticism tend to act 
impulsively, while those high on neuroticism tend to be emotionally unstable. Extraverts are 
thought to seek stimulation from the environment, while introverts have naturally stimulating 
internal environments and therefore seek less stimulation in their external surroundings (Acton, 
2003). The IVE-7 measures two aspects of impulsiveness: venturesomeness and impulsivity. 
Impulsivity, acting without thinking or without realizing the risks involved, is correlated with the 
personality dimension, Psychoticism. Venturesomeness, thrill and risk seeking, is correlated 
with the Extraversion dimension (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978; Caci, Nadalet, Bayle, Robert, & 
Boyer, 2003) .  The 54 questions on the IVE-7 fall into three separate scales, impulsiveness, 
venturesomeness and empathy; all items are in yes/no format. Though the main purpose of the 
questionnaire is to measure impulsiveness, the items focusing on empathy were added partly to 
breakup an otherwise "monotonous scale of fairly similar items" as well as to investigate 
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empathy' s  relationship to P, E and N (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1 978; p. 1 249). Though 
impulsiveness and venturesomeness correlate, they also represent two different aspects of 
impulsivity, one related to Psychoticism and one to Extraversion. Venturesomeness more 
correlated with Dickman's  Functional Impulsivity, which will be discussed shortly (Dickman, 
1990). 
BIS/BAS Scales 
Carver and White ( 1994) created two scales in an attempt to measure Gray' s two 
dimensions of personality, the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and behavioral approach 
system, or behavioral activation system (BAS; Gray 1 975, 1 977, 1 982). The BIS is related to 
sensitivity to punishment and, if overactive, is associated with anxiety, while the BAS is  
sensitive to signals of reward and is related to impulsivity. The BIS/BAS scales are made up of 
four scales: a BIS scale which includes seven items related to punishment and reactions to the 
anticipation of punishment, and three BAS scales, the Drive scale, the Fun Seeking scale, and the 
Reward Responsiveness scale. The Drive scale is made up of four items related to "persistent 
pursuit of desired goals" (Carver & White, 1994, p .  3 22). The Fun Seeking scale includes four 
. items pertaining to desire for rewards and willingness to approach rewarding environments on 
"the spur of the moment" (p. 322). Lastly, the Reward Responsiveness scale is made up of five 
items which focus on positive reactions to potential rewards. Each item is rated on a 4-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 ,  "strongly disagree", to 4, "strongly agree." Those who score high 
on the BAS scales are considered to be impulsive. Low BIS scores may also be related to 
disinhibition in populations such as psychopaths (Fowles, 1980). 
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Dickman Impulsivity Inventory 
Another self-report measure of trait impulsivity is the Dickman Impulsivity Inventory 
(DII) (Dickman, 1 990). As previously mentioned, Dickman proposes two types of impulsivity, 
dysfunctional and functional. Both types of impulsivity are defined by the tendency to act with 
little forethought, or less forethought than most people of equal ability; they differ in that this 
lack of deliberation leads to difficulty with dysfunctional impulsivity, but leads to optimal 
consequences with functional impulsivity (Dickman, 1 990). The DII distinguishes between the 
two types of impulsivity with 63 items--1 7  related to functional impulsivity, 23 to measure 
dysfunctional impulsivity, and 23 filler items. A high score on either functional or dysfunctional 
scales identifies someone as impulsive, while low scores classify non-impulsiveness. 
Self-Control Scale 
The Self-Control Scale was developed by Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone (2004) to 
measure the construct of self-control, as defined by the "ability to override or change one' s inner 
responses," and "interrupt undesired behavioral tendencies (such as impulses) and refrain from 
acting on them" (Tangney et al. ,  2004, p .274). The creators discussed six domains that they 
believe to be correlated with self-control: (I) achievement and task performance (GPA or work 
performance), (2) impulse control (eating and alcohol use), (3) adjustment (psychological 
disorders), (4) interpersonal relationship s, (5) moral emotions (e.g. shame leading to less self­
control), and ( 6) the two related personality features of conscientiousness and perfectionism. 
The Total Self-Control Scale is made up of 3 6  items in a 5-point Likert format (1 not at all like 
me, to 5 very much like me). The shorter version of the questionnaire, the Brief Self-Control 
Scale, i s  made up of 1 3  items and is highly correlated with its longer counterpart. 
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Laboratory Studies of Impulsivity 
Various Populations 
In the vast area of impulsivity, a wide variety of populations have been studied, including 
those who are dependent on alcohol, cocaine, heroin or cigarettes, those who pathologically 
gamble, individuals with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and psychiatric populations 
(Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Coffey, Guldeski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003 ; Dixon, Marley, & 
Jacobs, 2003 ; Epstein et al. ,  2003 ; Madden, Petry, Badgar, Bickel, 1997; Petry, 2001; Petry, 
2002).  Researchers have aimed to understand the nature of the impulsive personalities and 
behaviors that make up those populations. 
Drug and alcohol use/abuse & dependence. 
Individuals who frequently use or are dependent on drugs and alcohol have been the 
focus of much impulsivity research. These individuals are considered to be impulsive, when 
impulsiveness is defined by choosing an immediate, smaller reward over a larger but delayed 
reward (Logue, 1995; Madden et al. ,  1997; Rachlin & Green, 1972) as well as choosing small, 
immediate rewards that have delayed aversive consequences (Logue, 1995). 
Field, Christiansen, Goudie, and Goudie (2007) assessed 90 adolescent students who 
were identified as either heavy drinkers or light drinkers. The researchers employed two delay 
discounting tasks, one using monetary incentives and the other using alcohol rewards. They 
found that adolescents who engaged in heavy drinking showed "more short-term focus in 
decision making" than did light drinking adolescents in that they more steeply discounted both 
hypothetical monetary and alcoholic incentives (Field et al. ,  2007, p. 579). 
Another study by Petry (2001) looked at delay discounting of monetary and alcoholic 
incentives, but used participants currently dependent on alcohol, currently abstinent from alcohol 
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but with a history of alcohol dependence, and controls with no history of alcohol abuse. Petry 
found that alcoholic individuals discounted delayed rewards more rapidly than both controls and 
non-using alcoholics. Additionally, alcoholic clients discounted alcohol rewards more rapidly 
than money. Interestingly, controls also discounted alcohol more rapidly than money. 
Alcohol has also been shown to affect the inhibitory aspect of impulsivity. De Wit, 
Crean, and Richards (2000) investigated the affect of alcohol on impulsivity by actually 
administering the drug to healthy participants and assessing the effects on a stop task. They 
found that drinking alcohol impaired participants' ability to inhibit behavior. 
Studies with drug users are also important in impulsivity research. Similar to alcohol 
using populations, individuals dependent on cocaine chose the immediate, smaller monetary 
reward more often than the delayed, larger monetary reward in a study by Coffey et al. (2003); 
non-cocaine users were better able to wait for the larger reward than their cocaine addicted 
counterparts. Additionally, cocaine users discounted cocaine even more rapidly than money. 
Heroin dependent individuals show the same pattern when compared to non-dependent 
individuals when it comes to monetary rewards (Madden et al. , 1997). Again, greater 
discounting is seen when hypothetical heroin rewards replace the monetary incentives for heroin 
addicts. 
These significant laboratory findings translate to a lifestyle often seen in individuals 
addicted to drugs and alcohol :  they consistently choose the immediate pleasure of being high or 
intoxicated over larger but delayed rewards of sobriety (e.g., health, stable family, or 
employment), (Coffey et al. ,  2003). The fact that individuals with BPD similarly choose to 
engage in risky or destructive actions suggests that they too may discount delayed rewards 
quicker than other individuals. 
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Cigarette smoking. 
Those who smoke cigarettes have also been shown to be more impulsive through 
laboratory studies such as delay discounting. Bickel et al. (1999) recruited 23 current smokers, 
21  ex-smokers and 22 never smokers and had each group complete delay discounting tasks with 
monetary incentives. Additionally, current smokers completed delay discounting with cigarette 
incentives.  Bickel et al. (1999) found that people who were currently smoking discounted 
monetary rewards more rapidly than both those identified as ex-smokers and never smokers. 
Interestingly, ex-smokers did not discount monetary incentives at a faster rate than never 
smokers. Current smokers also discounted cigarette incentives faster than they did monetary 
rewards .  
A 2003 study again assessed smokers and non-smokers for impulsivity using delay 
discounting, but added a novel discounting task (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003). Participants 
completed a discounting task using monetary incentives, and then also completed one using 
health incentives. Researchers asked participants to equate a 10% increase in their health with 
$1,000; participants were asked to identify a length of time that f��eling healthier (stronger, less 
body fat, more energy) would be equal in subjective value to $1,000. This information was used 
to create values for a delay discount task. The smoking group also con1pleted a discounting task 
using cigarette incentives. Results showed that smokers discounted monetary rewards to a 
greater extent than non smokers, and, in accordance with Bickel et al. ' s  1999 study, smokers 
discounted cigarette incentives even more than monetary incentives. Both groups discounted 
monetary rewards at greater rate than health outcomes, but this result did not reach significance. 
Smokers and non-smokers did not differ in their discounting rates of health outcomes. Smokers, 
however, did discount cigarettes at a significantly higher rate than health outcomes, showing that 
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the drug of dependence is discounted more than equal amounts of incentives such as money and 
health. 
Another study assessed impulsivity in heavy, light and never smokers using delay 
discounting (Johnson, Bickel, & Baker, 2007). Again, smokers (both heavy and light) 
discounted monetary rewards more than never smokers, and discounted cigarettes more than 
monetary incentives. Health outcomes were also used in a delay discounting task; heavy, · light, 
and never smokers did not differ in discounting of health outcomes. Both light and heavy 
smokers, however, discounted cigarettes more rapidly than health outcomes. 
Gambling. 
Impulsivity is also an important aspect to gambling behavior. Dixon et al. (2003)  
evaluated a group of  twenty individuals identified as  gamblers as  well a s  twenty controls who 
were not gamblers. Each group completed the delay discounting task using index cards similar 
to the task used in substance use population (Bickel et al. ,  1 999) . The researchers found, akin to 
the research with drug and alcohol users and cigarette smokers, those who gambled discounted 
monetary rewards more steeply than did the group of controls. 
Alessi and Petry (2003) also recruited individuals diagnosed as pathological gamblers 
and assessed the severity of their gambling and their impulsivity using the IVE-7 and a delay 
discounting task, as well as other measures. They found that scores on the IVE-7 as well as 
severity of the gambling predicted results on the delay discounting task. Those who scored 
higher on the self-report measure discounted money more quickly. Even more predictive was 
the severity of the gambling problem, with light gamblers discounting 75% of $ 1 ,000 in about 
6 . 5 years, and heavy gambler discounting the same amount in only 2 years. 
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Dixon, Jacobs, and Sanders (2006) again used delay discounting with people diagnosed 
as pathological gamblers in a 2006 study, but this time researched if the context in which the 
participants were in affected their discounting. A group of pathological gamblers each 
completed two discounting tasks, one in a "gambling context" (an off-track betting facility with 
two bars and televisions broadcasting horse-racing), and one in a "nongambling context" (coffee 
shops, restaurants or another public location). Participants discounted money more steeply in the 
gambling context than in the non-gambl ing environment. 
As evidence by previously mentioned studies, substance abusers discount monetary 
rewards more than do non-substance users; Petry and Casarella ( 1999) also reported the same 
result regarding substance abusing participants versus controls, and additionally found that 
substance abusers who were also problem gamblers discounted monetary incentives more than 
substance abusers who did not have co-occuring gambling problems. 
The fact that those diagnosed with pathological gambling, a population that like clients 
with BPD are considered to be impulsive by definition (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), have been shown to be impulsive using delay discounting suggests that 
perhaps the same could be true of those with BPD. 
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (AD HD ). 
Impulsivity is  included in the DSM-IV-TR criteria for diagnosing in ADHD (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) and thus this population has also been an important part of 
impulsivity research. Epstein et al. (2003) investigated differences in performance on the CPT 
between children with ADHD and those without. They found that children diagnosed with 
ADHD committed more commission and omission errors and had more variable overall reaction 
times. 
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Gomez (2003) used a go/no-go task to measure impulsivity in children diagnosed with 
ADHD and healthy controls. Gomez used three different conditions of the tas� a reward only 
condition, a punishment only condition and a reward + punishment condition. In the reward only 
condition, participants would earn money for responding correctly to "good" numbers or 
refrained from responding to "bad" numbers, but would not lose anything if they responded in 
error to "bad" numbers. Conversely, in the punishment trials, participants lost money if they 
failed to respond to "good" numbers or responded to "bad" numbers. Lastly, participants would 
earn money for correct responses and lose money for responding to "bad" numbers. Gomez 
found that those with ADHD were more impulsive in all three conditions in that they committed 
more commission errors (responding to "bad" numbers). Additionally, the ADHD group showed 
varied impulsivity in the three kinds of tasks, while the control group did not; those with ADHD 
were more impulsive in the reward + punishment condition than in the other two conditions. 
Antisocial personality disorder & aggressive populations. 
A personality disorder that falls in the same cluster B category as BPD is antisocial 
personality disorder (ASPD). Individuals diagnosed with ASPD are also known to have 
impulsive behavior patterns and, because of this, they are another population studied using 
laboratory measures of impulsivity. Petry (2002) used a delay discounting task to compare 
discounting between substance abusing individuals who also had ASPD and substance abusing 
individuals without a comorbid personality disorder. Each group was also compared to a control 
group with no substance abuse or ASPD. Results showed that, again, substance abusing persons 
discounted money more steeply than controls. More importantly, the substance abusing ASPD 
group discounted monetary rewards even more than substance abusers with no ASPD. Because 
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the two groups had similar substance abuse characteristics, it was concluded that the difference 
in discounting rates was due to the ASPD diagnosis, not the substance abuse. 
Another study, though not specifically with participants diagnosed with ASPD, examined 
impulsivity with aggressive and nonaggressive male parolees (Cherek, Moeller, Dougherty, & 
Rhoades, 1 997) . Based upon criminal history, the parolees were separated into two groups, 
nonviolent and violent. Both groups completed a two choice self-control task; pressing the 
microswitch button labeled A would result in a 5 second delay and a reward of 5 cents on the 
counter, while pressing the B button resulted in a 1 5  second delay and 1 5  cents being added to 
the counter. The researchers found that the violent parolees were more impulsive during the 
task. Violent parolees chose the impulsive choice (A) more than half of the time. The mean 
number of impulsive choices for the violent group was 3 5 .  8, while the mean number for the 
nonviolent group was 2 1 .2 (t=3 .47, p<.002). Additionally, violent parolees scored higher on the 
BIS- 1 1 than did their nonviolent counterparts. 
Newman and Schmitt ( 1998) investigated inhibitory control of low-anxious psychopaths 
compared to low-anxious controls .  After screening a group of inmates using the Revised 
Psychopathy Checklist (PCL-R; Hare, 1 99 1  ), Newman and Schmitt administered a passive 
avoidance task to inmates identified as psychopathic and a group of control inmates. The 
researchers found that the low-anxious psychopaths committed more passive avoidance errors 
than low-anxious controls. 
Borderline Personality Disorder 
Impulsiveness among individuals with BPD has been routinely studied in the laboratory 
setting with various outcomes. Researchers have used multiple laboratory measures as well as 
self report measures to try to get at the essence of impulsivity in the borderline population. 
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In their study of female inmates with BPD, Hochhausen et al. (2002) used a passive 
avoidance task as well as the self-report questionnaire, the Impulsiveness-Monotony Avoidance­
Detachment inventory (IMD; Schalling, 1 978). The IMD was developed to evaluate dimensions 
responsible for dysregulated behavior in psychopaths, but it has a specific Impulsivity scale. The 
researchers found that those inmates with BPD showed greater impulsivity than non-borderline 
inmates 'using a passive avoidance task, as defined by committing more commission errors 
(responding to the wrong stimuli) than controls. Inmates diagnosed with BPD also reported 
greater impulsivity than non-BPD inmates on the Impulsivity scale of the IMD. 
In their 2006 study, Dom et al. evaluated individuals with alcoholism who did or did not 
have a cluster-B personality disorder diagnosis and compared their impulsivity in a variety of 
ways. Both groups had been abstinent from alcohol for at least three weeks. Of those diagnosed 
with a personality disorder, 1 5  had BPD, 3 had ASPD, 2 had both BPD and ASPD and 2 were 
diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder. Both groups were given two self report 
measures (BIS- 1 1  and the Dutch adaption sensation-seeking scale), and three behavioral 
measures of impulsivity. The first was the Go/no-go task, then the Stroop color word test was 
given, (which is often used as a measure ofbehavioral inhibition), and finally a delay 
discounting task. Each measure yielded quite disparate results. The researchers found that 
participants who had a co-occuring personality disorder diagnosis scored higher on both self-
report measures of impulsivity than those who did not. Those with a personality disorder also 
showed more impulsivity on the Go/no-go task (more errors) . There was, however, no 
significant differences found between groups on either the Stroop test or the delay discounting 
task. From these results, the researchers concluded that people diagnosed with both alcoholism 
and a personality disorder have difficulty with behavioral inhibition compared to those with 
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alcoholism and no personality disorder, but they do not differ in activation impulsivity or the 
ability delay gratification. 
Another study also addressed impulsivity in alcohol dependent individuals with and 
without cluster-B personality disorders (Rubio et al. ,  2007). Researchers used the BIS- 1 1  to 
measure trait impulsivity, as well as CPT, the Stop-Signal Task and Differential Reinforcement 
of Low-Rate Responding (DRLR) as behavioral impulsivity measures. DRLR is another type of 
delay task that measures a person' s impulse control and their ability to avoid a premature 
response. Participants press a button, are instructed to "wait a while" and then press it again. If 
they wait at least 6 seconds a point reward is given signaled by a flashing light. If they respond 
too quickly, the timer resets and no reward is given. In this study, researchers found that those 
with a cluster-B disorder (BPD or ASPD) performed worse on all behavioral tasks than those 
alcoholics without a personality disorder and the controls. More specifically, participants with 
BPD committed more omission errors on the CPT, while individuals with ASPD were more 
impaired on the DRLR. These resuits again suggest that those with BPD have more trouble with 
inhibition than with delay of rewards. 
Though Rubio et al . (2007) found that patients with BPD committed more errors in the 
, another study by Ferrez et al . (2009) found contradicting results. Though they once again 
found that individuals with BPD scored significantly higher on all the subscales of the BIS- 1 1 
than did healthy controls, they did not replicate the finding that participants with BPD committed 
more errors on the CPT measure. They did, however, find that the BPD group made more 
random errors, which they hypothesized may have been evidence of a lack of motivation to 
respond correctly, a possible explanation for their non-significant results. 
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Dougherty, Bjork et al. ( 1999) employed a two-choice delayed reward task and the BIS-
1 1  to measure impulsiveness in inpatients with BPD compared to inpatients without BPD. In the 
impulsivity laboratory task the participants could choose between pressing the 'A' button to 
receive 5 cents after a short delay (impulsive choice) and pressing the 'B' button to receive 1 5  
cents after a longer delay. Two kinds of data from the two-choice delay task were utilized: the 
percentage of "impulsive" choices, and the .longest delay before the reward presentation in a trial. 
The researchers found that the BPD group scored significantly higher on the total score and the 
attentional sub scale of the BIS- 1 1 compared to controls. As for the behavioral measure, there 
was no significant main effect between groups in overall impulsive responding. Patients with 
BPD did have a longer average delay before responding in the first session than the controls did, 
but in the second session the BPD group changed their responding patterns to avoid long delays 
(switching between short delay and long delay response in consecutive trials) while the control 
groups remained stable. The maximum delay before reward dropped by 50% in the second 
session for the BPD group, but remained the same for the control group. The researchers 
connected this change in responding to the BPD groups' higher score on the attentional subscale 
of the BIS- 1 1 .  Overall, however, the two-choice delayed reward did not differentiate between 
patients with BPD and controls. 
Subclinical samples, such as undergraduate college students high on borderline traits, 
have also been used to study impulsivity and have shown marked impulsivity compared to those 
undergraduates low on borderline traits (Chapman et al. , 2008). Chapman et al. utilized a 
passive avoidance learning task to measure impulsivity in a group of students who they 
categorized into either a "high-BPD" (a score of 3 8  or higher on the Personality Assessment 
Inventory-Borderline Features Scale, or PAI-BOR) or a "low-BPD" group (a score less than 23 
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on the PAI-BOR). They found that the high-BPD group committed significantly more passive 
avoidance errors than did the low-BPD group. This replicated the findings ofHochhausen et al. 
(2002) in a nonclinical sample. Though no laboratory measures of impulsivity were used in their 
study, Fossati et al. (2004) also used a nonclinical sample to measure borderline traits and 
impulsivity. Using the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4+ (as cited in Fossati et al. ,  2004), 
the researchers created two groups, one group having borderline traits and one having antisocial 
traits. They found that the level of impulsivity as measured by the BIS- 1 1 was significantly 
correlated with BPD symptoms. 
Though laboratory measures that assess initiation and inhibition aspects of impulsivity 
such as PAL and Go/no-go tasks, and CPT measures in some instances, have been shown to 
produce significant differences between those with BPD and those without, the use of the delay 
discounting tasks and other delay type tasks have not been as successful. It would seem 
plausible that those who are impulsive would have trouble delaying the reward and would choose 
the immediate but smaller reward; the propinquity of the first reward is too tempting, and waiting 
a longer period makes the larger reward seems distant and not worth the wait. Despite this, the 
preference for immediate small rewards among individuals with BPD has not been shown in a 
research study as of yet. This may be explained by the fact that impulsivity itself has different 
operational definitions, and perhaps patients with BPD are not impulsive when it comes to 
intolerance of delay. Before this conclusion can be drawn with confidence, however, further 
investigation is necessary. Another possibility is that the incentives used are not reinforcing 
enough for this population, which is why there is not a heightened sensitive to delay. Research 
has pinpointed several variables related to the reinforcer that affect impulsivity. 
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Variables that Affect Impulsivity 
Preference for the Reinforcer 
Research has shown that participants will wait for the delayed reward more when they 
prefer that reward. Forzano and Logue ( 1 995) conducted two experiments, one with preschool 
boys and one with adult women to assess the affect of food preference on self-control. After 
assessing the participants' preferences for a Cheerio, raisin or M&M, the boys completed a series 
of conditions with varying delays and reinforcers. The researchers found that participants 
showed more self-control, (they endured the longer delay), when it produced the more preferred 
reward. Additionally, participants chose the smaller, more immediate reinforcer when it was the 
most preferred reward. Similarly, women in the second experiment were less sensitive to 
reinforcer amount relative to sensitivity to delay (a measure of impulsivity) when the 
reinforcement was the most preferred reward. Overall, these two experiments demonstrate that 
preference for the reinforcer is an important variable in impulsivity and self-control. 
Time of Reinforcer Delivery 
Forzano and Logue ( 1994) conducted three experiments to investigate the reason why 
individuals are more impulsive for food as reinforcement than for points exchangeable for 
money. The first experiment used juice as a reinforcer available during the session as well as 
points exchangeable for money. The second, used points exchangeable for money and the third 
experiment was the same as the second except it used points exchangeable for juice. The 
researchers found that participants showed greater self-control when the reinforcer was available 
at the end of the session (points exchangeable for money or juice) than for the reinforcer 
available during the session Guice) . Because there were also no differences in self-control for 
points exchangeable for money and those exchangeable for juice, researchers concluded that the 
35 
increase in self-control for the reinforcers available after the session was at least partly due to the 
time of the delivery, not the reinforcer itself. When the reinforcer i s  closer and more tangible at 
the time the choice is  being made, self-control is more difficult. These results support past 
research in which �1ischel and Ebbesen ( 1970) found that children had more self-control when 
the food reinforcer was not visible, but were more impulsive when the reinforcer was visible. 
Primary vs. Secondary Reinforcers 
Another possible variable that affects impulsivity is the nature of the reinforcer itself, that 
is, whether it is a primary or secondary reinforcer. A primary reinforcer, or an unconditioned 
reinforcer, is one that is intrinsically reinforcing to the person, such as food or water, and does 
not need to be learned through conditioning (Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 2007). A secondary, or 
conditioned reinforcer, such as money, i s  one that becomes reinforcing through experience and 
through pairing with something already reinforcing (Cooper et al. ,  2007). Though both types 
affect behavior in a similar way, they can affect impulsivity differently. 
As mentioned previously, those with drug or alcohol dependence discount their drug of 
choice significantly more rapidly than they do money (Coffey et al. ,  2003; Field et al. ,  2007; 
Madden et al. ,  1 997; Petry, 2001 ). Odum and Rainaud (2003) investigated this phenomenon 
using three different reinforcers and a group of individuals without past problems with money or 
history of alcohol abuse. Participants completed delay discounting tasks with two 
primary/consumable reinforcers, food and alcohol, and one secondary/non-consumable 
reinforcer, money. Much like the studies with drug and alcohol dependent individuals, 
participants discounted food and alcohol more steeply than money. Additionally, food and 
alcohol were discounted at a similar rate. The researchers suggest that this pattern in discounting 
may be due to the fact that food and alcohol are primary and consumable reinforcers, as opposed 
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to the secondary reinforcing quality of money. This may also explain why Petry (200 1 )  found 
that the control group, not just the alcoholic group, discounted alcohol more than they did 
money. 
The Present Study 
The present study aimed to further investigate the nature of impulsivity in borderline 
personality disorder using a subclinical sample of undergraduate students. Using the Borderline 
Personality Questionnaire (BPQ; Poreh et al., 2006) students were screened to determine those 
high and low on borderline traits .  Both groups were then given a series of measures to assess 
impulsivity. Though past studies did not find significant differences in impulsivity between 
participants with BPD and those without BPD when using delay discounting with monetary 
reinforcers, it was thought that using a more salient reinforcer might affect impulsivity in the 
same way alcohol, drugs, cigarettes and money affect discounting for alcoholics, drug dependent 
individuals, smokers and gamblers respectively (Baker et al. ,  2003 ; Bickel et al. ,  1 999; Coffey et 
al. ,  2003 ; Dixon et al. ,  2003 ; Madden et al. ,  1 997; Petry, 200 1 ) .  
Because interpersonal relationships and the need for attachment are important features of 
BPD (American Psychological Association, 2000; Gunderson, 1 996; Mizenberg et al., 2006; 
Zanarini et al. ,  2007) it was thought that the use of some kind of social incentive within the delay 
discounting task might augment impulsivity in this population. Prior studies had suggested that 
future research should use social or physical incentives in similar impulsiveness tasks, but no 
such study had yet been conducted (Chapman et al. ,  2008) . 
For those with BPD, social contact was thought to possibly be a more salient reinforcer 
than money. Social reinforcement, like food and alcohol (Odum & Rainaud, 2003), could be 
viewed as a primary reinforcer, or at least a generalized reinforcer, due to the inherent 
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reinforcing quality of attention and contact with others, which is  apparent even early in life. For 
example, human touch was found to be a reinforcer for infants (Pelaez-Nogueras, Gewirtz, Field, 
Cigales, Malphurs, Clasky, & Sanchez, 1 996). Infants made more eye-contact, more 
vocalizations, smiled more and cried less when they were reinforced with adult attention that 
included touch compared to when they were reinforced with adult attention that did not 
incorporate touch. Other studies have also shown that intera.ction is reinforcing to humans. 
When interaction and attention from others was made contingent on a target behavior, that 
behavior often increased (Jerome & Sturmey, 2008; Milby, 1 970) . Attention and interaction can 
take a variety of forms, such as eye contact, positive talk, nodding, close proximity to the client, 
(Jerome & Sturmey, 2008) or time with a preferred staff member (Milby, 1 970). Some studies 
also suggest that social contact may reinforce negative behaviors such as self-injurious behavior 
(Oliver, Hall, & Murphy, 2005). 
In the present study, social reinforcement took the form of time with a loved one. To 
compare discounting rates fur monetary incentives and social incentives, the two needed to be 
equated in some way. A method similar to the one used in previous research on delay 
discounting with drug dependent populations (Coffey et al. ,  2003 ; Madden et al. ,  1 997) was used 
to do this. For example, Madden et al. ( 1 997) used the street price of heroin to equate the 
amount of the drug to the monetary amounts; at $35  per bag, 28. 5 bags of heroin were equal to 
$ 1 ,000. In the present study, the social reinforcement, time with a loved one, was given a 
monetary value as well. Participants were asked to indicate their hourly wage at their current or 
most recent job, which was used to obtain an average hourly wage for all participants willing to 
participate in the laboratory sessions. This process assigned a monetary value to one hour of time 
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and was used to determine how many hours equal about $ 1000, allowing the two discounting 
tasks to be compared. 
Because past research found that individuals diagnosed with BPD have difficulty with 
response inhibition (Chapman et al. ,  2008; Dom et al. ,  2006; Hochhausen et al. ,  2002), the 
present study also included the GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm (Dougherty, Mathias et al . ,  2003) 
to assess the participants' ability to inhibit responses. This specific measure-of response 
inhibition had not yet been used in a subclinical population, so including it added to the literature 
regarding inhibition aspect of impulsivity in BPD. It also made for a more thorough assessment 
of the heterogeneous impulsivity construct within this study. 
Due to the rich evidence that the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale- 1 1  successfully measures 
impulsiveness in those with BPD (Cherek et al, 1 997; Dougherty et al. ,  1 999; Ferrez et al. ,  2009; 
Fossati et al. ,  2004), it was used in the present study as well to hopefully replicate findings that 
the BIS- 1 1 can be used to measure impulsivity in nonclinical populations ofBPD (Fossati et al. ,  
2004) . 
Hypotheses 
There were several hypotheses in the current study. The main hypothesis was that high­
BPD individuals would discount more steeply in a delay discounting task (hence demonstrate 
more impulsivity) when the reinforcers used were of a social or interpersonal nature. As found 
previously (Dom et al. ,  2006), it was expected that there would be no difference in discounting 
rates of monetary rewards between the low-BPD group and the high-BPD group. High-BPD 
individuals, however, would discount social rewards more steeply than they did monetary 
rewards and more steeply than did low-BPD participants. High-BPD individuals would also 
discount social rewards at significantly steeper than they did monetary rewards. A significant 
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finding would demonstrate that impulsivity among those with BPD traits could be measured 
using a delay discounting task if a social incentive was incorporated. This would further suggest 
the importance of interpersonal relationships and attachment when it comes to impulsivity for 
individuals with BPD. 
Next, it was hypothesized that the high-BPD group would exhibit greater difficulty 
inhibiting responses than the low-BPD group on the GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm. These 
results would replicate findings that BPD individuals have difficulty with response inhibition 
(Chapman et al. ,  2008; Dom et al. ,  2006; Hochhausen et al. ,  2002), and would also be the first to 
use the GoStop task with a subclinical BPD population. 
Finally, replicating previous research (Cherek et al, 1 997; Dougherty et al. ,  1 999; Ferrez 
et al. ,  2009; Fossati et al. ,  2004), it was hypothesized that the high-BPD group would score 
significantly higher on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale- 1 1  than the low-BPD group, showing that 
nonclinical groups are still distinct in their self-reported impulsivity. Additionally, if the BIS- 1 1 
discriminated between groups as predicted, such results would help validate the BPQ as a 
measure that accurately identifies individuals with traits ofBPD. 
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate students from the PSH 1 10, Principles ofPsychology courses at the 
College at Brockport, State University of New York were initially recruited for this study. 
Participants were recruited two waves, the first in the Fall 2009 semester and the second 
during Spring 201 0  semester. During the first wave, additional College at Brockport students 
from psychology courses other than PSH 1 1 0 were later recruited in order to obtain enough 
participants for the initial screens, due to lower than expected initial response rates. The students 
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in the first wave ranged in age from 1 8  to 48 years, with a mean age of 20.4 years. Two-hundred 
and sixty-eight participants were initially screened with the BPQ (Poreh et al. ,  2006), resulting in 
approximately 57 potential participants (23 low and 3 4  high) for the laboratory sessions. Thirty­
eight participants participated in the laboratory session. After exclusion criteria (as used by 
Dixon, Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006) was applied to the data (explained below), there were 1 5  high­
BPD participants (a score of 3 3  or greater on the BPQ), and 14 low-BPD individuals (score of 5 
or lower) for a total of29 participants in wave I. 
One hundred and thirty-one participants, ranging in age from 1 8  to 39 years (M=1 9 .2  
years), were screened with the BPQ for the second wave, resulting in 42 potential laboratory 
participants, (2 l low and 2 1  high). A total of 3 3  individuals participated in the laboratory 
session, which, after exclusions, resulted in 1 1  high-BPD individuals (a score of 26 or greater on 
the BPQ) and 1 0  low-BPD participants (a score of 4 or lower) and a total of2 1  participants in 
wave II. 
Overall, 399 participants, ranging in age from 1 8  to 48 years (M=20.02 years), were 
screened between the two waves. Wave I and II combined resulted in 50 participants 
successfully completing the laboratory session, with 24 in the low-BPD group and 26 in the 
high-BPD group. As predicted by past research, (Swartz et al. ,  1 990; Widiger & Weissman, 
1 99 1 ;  Zanarini et al. ,  1 990b), most of the participants were female (84 .2% in wave I, 87 .9% in 
wave II, and 85 .9% for the two groups combined) . Participants from PSH 1 1 0 received one 
credit of their research requirement for their participation in the initial screening, and then 
another one credit if they qualified and agreed to participate in the laboratory session. The 
participants from other psychology courses were given extra credit for the screening and 
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additional extra credit for the laboratory session, with the amount of extra credit determined by 
each course instructor. 
Materials 
Borderline Personality Questionnaire (BPQ). 
The Borderline Personality Questionnaire (BPQ; Poreh et al. ,  2006; see Appendix A) is 
an 80-item, true/false measure which assesses the nine DSM-IV criteria for borderline 
personality disorder. The BPQ has high reliability for the overall score (Kuder-Richardson 
coefficient = 0.94) and satisfactory reliability for each subscale (ranging from KR-20 = 0.65 to 
KR-20 = 0. 84). It also shows high convergent validity with the MMPI-2 BPD (r = 0. 85 ;  Poreh et 
al. , 2006) . When compared to three other measures, the McLean screening Instrument for 
Borderline Personality Disorder (MSI-BPD), the BPD items from the International Personality 
Disorder Examination Screen Questionnaire and the BPD items from the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis II disorders (SCID-II) Personality Questionnaire, the BPQ was 
found to have the highest overall diagnostic accuracy (0. 85 )  and the highest test-retest reliabiiity 
(ICC 0.92;  Chanen et aL, 2008) .  
According to the literature, high scores on the BPQ are 57  or higher, while the average 
score is around 2 1  (Chanen et al. ,  2008; Poreh et al . ,  2006). Though the researcher planned to 
use 57 as the high cut-off score and 20 as the low cut-off score, the need to change the criteria 
arose once completed questionnaires were scored. Since very few participants scored 57 or 
higher in either wave, the mean and standard deviation of each sample was calculated (M= l 8 .62, 
SD= l 3 . 6 1  for wave I; M=l 4.98, SD=1 0 . 79 for wave II). Using one standard deviation below 
and above the mean, new cut-off scores of 3 3 and 5 were used to create the two groups in wave I .  
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Cut off scores of 26 and 4 were used for wave II. Though the BPQ is  relatively long, it only took 
participants 1 0  to 1 5  minutes to complete. 
Demographic questionnaire .. 
As part of the screening session, necessary demographic information was collected from 
all participants using a short questionnaire (see Appendix B and Appendix C). The participants' 
age and gender were of primary importance for the current study. As previously mentioned, they 
were also asked to indicate their hourly wage at their current or most recent job in order to obtain 
an average hourly wage for all participants qualified for the laboratory sessions. The average 
wage for wave I participants was $8 . 7 1  per/hour ( 1 1 5 hours equaling $ 1000). The average wage 
for wave II participants was $8.27 per/hour ( 1 2 1  hours equaling $ 1000). Lastly, participants 
were asked whether they were interested in being contacted to participate in the second part of 
the study should they qualify. 
Contact form. 
Participants who answered "yes" to being contacted for the second part of the study were 
directed to fill out the contact information form (see Appendix D) including their name and 
phone number. This allowed the researcher to contact those participants who qualified for the 
laboratory session. 
Delay discounting tasks. 
The present study used a delay discounting task using a computer program called delay 
discounting (gains) program (Chelonis, 2006) . Hypothetical monetary rewards of various 
amounts were presented on the left and right side of the computers screen. The larger, delayed 
amount appeared on the left side of the screen, while the smaller, immediate amount appeared on 
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the left side. Participants chose which amount they preferred by pressing either the 'q' or 'p' 
key. The program then titrated the next choice based on the participants' previous choice. 
For example, the first choice was between receiving $ 1 000 in a week (on the left side of 
the screen) and receiving $500 immediately. The participant indicated their choice by pressing 
'q'  or 'p ' .  If the participant chose the delayed choice, the next trial would titrate the immediate 
choice to a higher amount: $ 1 000 in one week, or $750 immediately. If the participant chose the 
immediate reward, the amount of immediate reward was decreased on the next trial. This 
process continued until the computer had enough information to calculate the individual' s  
indifference point (or the point at which the delayed and immediate amounts were subjectively 
equal) . There were eight sets of delays that the computer went through using the same process: 1 
week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 3 years, 5 years, 1 0  years and 25 years. 
The same program was used, with slight revisions, for the social discounting task. As 
previously explained, instead of $ 1000, the large, delayed amount of incentive was hours with a 
loved one ( 1 1 5 hours for wave I and 1 2 1  hours for wave II) . The immediate small amount was 
titrated the same way and the participant indicated their choice by pressing the same keys. 
GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm. 
The Go Stop Impulsivity Paradigm was completed on a computer using the software 
developed by Dougherty, Mathias et al. (2003) .  This paradigm was used to measure response 
inhibition for both groups. There were three types of trials :  no-stop, stop and novel trials. Five­
digit numbers were presented on the computer screen in rapid sequence. In the no-stop trial, a 5-
digit number identical to the one before it (a target stimuli) was presented in black on the screen; 
this was a go signal and the participant was to respond by clicking the right mouse button. For 
half of the target trials, the go signal was accompanied by a stop signal unexpectedly, which was 
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when the number changed from back to red at some point after the onset of the stimulus (ranging 
from 50  to 3 50 msec after the presentation of the stimulus). This was a stop trial and signaled to 
the participant to inhibit their response. A novel trial was when the second number was a 
randomly generated 5-digit number that was not the same as the pervious stimulus and required 
no response. The dependent variable for this task was the percentage of inhibited responses, or 
the percentage of Stop trials where no response occurred. The Go Stop program provided an 
inhibition percentage for each stimulus delay period (50msec, 1 50msec, 250 msec, and 3 50 
msec) . For the purposes of data analysis, only the 1 50msec data was used because research 
shows that that set of data most accurately discriminates between groups (Dougherty et al. ,  2008, 
Marsh et al. ,  2002) . Lower numbers indicated greater difficulty inhibiting responses. 
Instructions on how to complete the task were presented to participants before they began (see 
Appendix F) .  
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-1 1 ). 
The eleventh edition of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (see Appendix E) was 
administered to both the low-BPD and high-BPD groups to measure self-reported impulsivity. 
Highly impulsive individuals are designated by scores of 72 or higher, while scores of 52 to 7 1  
are indicative or normal levels of impulsiveness (Stanford et al . ,  2009). The 3 0-item 
questionnaire took about 5 minutes to complete. 
Procedure 
The screening process was done over several weeks. To ensure confidentiality, 
participants were given a folder with their participant number on it which contained all necessary 
materials. The folder consisted of a consent form (see Appendix G and Appendix H), a 
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demographics questionnaire (see Appendix B and Appendix C), a contact form (see Appendix 
D), and the BPQ (see Appendix A). 
Participants were instructed to complete the top consent form first before proceeding 
with additional forms and to return their competed folder to the researcher when finished. They 
were handed a debriefing sheet (see Appendix I) on theirway out. Each screening session took 
about 1 5  minutes. 
Once all BPQs were scored, the participants who scored either high (3 3 or higher in wave 
I and 26 or higher in wave II) or low ( 5 or lower in wave I and 4 or lower in wave II) on the BPQ 
were contacted via telephone and/or email and asked to return for another session (see Appendix 
J and Appendix K). Each lab session was done with a maximum of seven participants at a time 
in Holmes Hall . The lab consisted of seven small rooms, each with a computer, table and chair. 
Low-BPD and high-BPD students were able to sign up for any session, regardless if members of 
the opposite group were in that session. 
During the laboratory session, after obtaining informed consent (see Appendix L and 
Appendix M), each participant completed the three computer tasks individually, the Go Stop 
Impulsivity Paradigm, the delay discounting task with monetary incentives and the delay 
discounting task with social incentives. The order in which these tasks were completed was 
counterbalanced and randomly assigned to participants ahead of time. Though the order of the 
Go Stop and the two delay discounting tasks changed, the delay discounting tasks always 
occurred one after the other (with some participants doing the monetary version first and some 
completing the social incentive version first). In all, there were four possible combinations of 
the tasks. Once the participants were contacted and signed up for a session, the researcher pre­
assigned everyone to the order in which they were to complete the tasks by picking conditions 
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from a hat. Because the BIS- 1 1 could be very reactive, all participants completed the 
questionnaire last. 
Though each session was scheduled for an hour, no participant used a whole hour to 
complete all the tasks. The GoStop task took about 1 5  minutes to complete while each delay 
discounting task took about 5 minutes. The directions for the monetary version of the delay 
discounting task appeared on the screen as follows : 
In this game you will be required to make hypothetical choices between a smaller, 
immediate monetary reward and a larger, delayed reward. The larger, delayed amount 
will be presented on the left side of the screen. The smaller, immediate amount of money 
will be present on the right side of the screen. Press q to choose the larger, delayed 
reward or p to choose the smaller, immediate reward for each trial. Press q or p to begin. 
Prior to beginning the social version of the delay discounting task, each participant was 
given a piece of paper asking them to please indicate the person they most like to spend their free 
time with and why they enjoy spending time with this person (see Appendix N). They were 
asked to think of this person as they completed the social version of the delay discounting task. 
The instructions for this task appeared on the screen as follows: 
In this game you will be required to make hypothetical choices between a smaller, 
immediate amount of time with the person you most enjoy spending free time with and a 
larger, delayed amount of time with this person. The larger, delayed amount will be 
presented on the left side o the screen. The smaller, immediate amount of time will be 
present on the right side of the screen. Press q to choose the larger, delayed reward or p 
to choose the smaller, immediate reward for each trial. Press q or p to begin. 
The BIS- 1 1 was completed after all three computer tasks were finished. Once each 
participant finished the four tasks, they were verbally debriefed (see Appendix 0) and given a 
hand out of contact information in case they had questions or wished to seek help regarding any 
items they encountered during the session (see Appendix P). 
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Results 
First, the BPQ was scored. Each item was true or false and was worth either 1 point or 0 
points. In most cases, an answer of 'true' resulted in 1 point, while ' false' was scored as zero. 
Some items, however, were reversed scored and in those items an answer of 'false' resulted in a 
point. The total score was derived from the adding points from all the items. Table 1 provides 
each participant's demographics information as well their BPQ score and group (high or low) . 
Several steps were necessary to calculate discounting rates for each individual. The delay 
discounting program provided indifference points for each participant for each delay amount. 
Those indifference points were then be used to calculate the k value, or sensitivity to delay. The 
hyperbolic discounting function originated by Mazur ( 1987) was used to calculate k: 
Va = A/(1 +kd) 
This equation has been used in multiple studies to measure delay discounting (Alessi & Petry, 
2003 ; Coffey, 2003 ; Johnson et al. ,  2007; Madden et al. ,  1 997; Navarick, 2004). In this 
equation, Va equals the subjective discounted value of the reward (the indifference point). The 
objective value of the reward is represented by A ($ 1 000), and d is the delay duration 
(represented in years). The equation was used to solve for k and to determine each individual' s  
best fit  k, or their sensitivity to  the delay, with lower values indicating less sensitivity to  delay 
and higher values indicating higher sensitivity to delay and steeper discounting (greater 
impulsivity). The individual proportions of variance (R2) accounted for by the hyperbolic model 
were also calculated, where an R2 of 1 .  0 indicates responses that fit perfectly with the hyperbolic 
model. The indifference points, k values, and R2 values for each participant can be found in 
Table 2 .  
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As done in previous research (Dixon, Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006; Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 
2003 ), some participants were excluded from data analysis due to responses inconsistent with the 
delay discounting. The following exclusion criteria, developed by Dixon et al. (2006), were used 
to assess each participant' s data for both discounting tasks. The indifference points could not 
increase more than once across successive delays. Additionally, the mean indifference points 
from the four shortest delay conditions had to exceed the mean of the indifference points from 
the four longest delays. Using these criteria, the social discounting results for seven individuals 
and the monetary discounting scores for two individuals were excluded in wave I. In wave II, 
eight social discounting scores were excluded, and six monetary discounting scores were 
excluded. Two monetary discounting scores in wave I and one monetary discounting score in 
wave II were also excluded due to computer difficulties in either the saving or retrieving of data 
(see table 1 ) .  
The GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm program provided the dependent variable, percentage 
of inhibited responses, or the percentage of stop trials where no response occurred. The 
inhibition percentage was calculated for each stimulus delay, 50msec, 1 50msec, 250msec and 
3 50 msec. Lower numbers indicated greater difficulty inhibiting responses (more impulsivity) 
while higher percentages indicated greater ability to inhibit responses (less impulsivity). Table 1 
also contains each participant ' s  inhibition scores on the Go Stop at 1 50msec. 
The items of the BIS- 1 1 were scored 1 ,  2, 3, or 4, with 4 assigned to the most impulsive 
answer. For example, item 1 states, "I plan things carefully" ; here an answer of "Rarely/Never" 
would receive a 4 and an answer of"Almost Always/ Always" would receive a 1 .  Item 2, on the 
other hand, states, "I do things without thinking"; here "Almost Always/ Always" would be the 
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most impulsive answer and would therefore receive a 4. The total score was found by adding the 
points from every item. Table 1 contains the total BIS- 1 1 scores for each participant. 
Wave I and IT 
A one-way between-subjects MANOVA was used to examine the differences between 
the low-BPD and high-BPD groups on delay discounting tasks for monetary and social 
incentives (k values), the Go Stop Impulsivity Paradigm (inhibition percentage), and the BIS- 1 1 
(total scores) . Table 3 displays the means and standard deviations for each group on each 
dependent variable. 
Delay discounting. 
There was no difference between groups on either delay discounting task. As expected, 
high-BPD individuals in wave I did not discount money (M=22. 1 3 , SD=59. 5 6) at a significantly 
greater rate, F( 1 ,  28)=0. 584, p=.45 1 ,  than the low-BPD participants (M=8.8 1 ,  SD=27.47) . 
S imilarly, there was no significant difference, F(l ,  28)=.235, p=.632, in discounting rate of 
social incentives between the high-BPD (M=50.86, SD= l 04.72) and low-BPD groups (M=34. 1 9, 
SD=77.20) in wave I. Similar results were found for wave II participants. There was no 
significant difference between high-BPD participants (M=29. 80, SD=53 .83)  and low-BPD 
participants (M=8. 37, SD= l 8 .93)  in monetary discounting, F( 1 ,20)= 1 .42, p=.248 .  In addition, 
high-BPD participants (�v1=34. 56, SD=93 .26) and lovv-BPD participants (I\1=1 14 .77, 
SD=264.92) did not significantly differ in their rate of social discounting, F(1 ,20)=.89 1 , p=.357. 
Differences in monetary versus social discounting within groups was also calculated 
using a repeated-measures t-test. High-BPD individuals did not discount monetary (M=22. 1 3 , 
SD=59 .56) and social rewards (M=50.86, SD= 1 04.72) differently in wave I, t(1 4)= -0. 89, p=.39 .  
Similarly, the low-BPD wave I group did not discount monetary rewards (M=8 . 8 1 ,  SD=27.47) at 
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a significantly lower rate than they did social rewards (M=34. 1 9, SD=77.20), t( 1 3)=- 1 . 82, 
p=O . 09. Similar results were found in wave II participants. High-BPD individuals did not 
discount monetary rewards (M=29. 8 1 ,  SD=53 .83)  differently than social rewards (M=34. 56, 
SD=93 .26), !( 1 0)=-0. 14  p=. 89. Low-BPD participants also did not discount monetary rewards 
(M=8.37, SD=1 8 .93)  at a significantly lower rate than social rewards (M= l l4 .  77, SD=264.92), 
t(9)=- 1 .3 0, p=.23 . 
GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm. 
High-BPD participants and low-BPD participants did not differ in their ability to inhibit 
responses on the GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm. As previously mentioned, only results from the 
1 50msec delay were used since that data most accurately discriminates between groups, 
(Dougherty et al. ,  2008, Marsh et al. ,  2002). For wave I, high-BPD individuals inhibited 6 1 . 33% 
of the time and low-BPD inhibited 59 .64% of the time, F(l ,  28)=.034, p=0.85 .  High-BPD 
individuals . in wave II inhibited 62.27% of the time and low-BPD participants inhibited 52%, 
F(l ,20)=.87, p=.3 6. The differences between high and low groups were not significant in either 
wave. 
BIS-11.  
For wave I ,  results showed that there was a significant difference between groups on the 
BIS- 1 1 ,  F(l ,  29)= 7. 54, p=. O l ,  with the high-BPD group scoring significantly higher (M=7 1 .93 , 
SD= l 3 . 1 0) than the low-BPD group (M=60.2 1 ,  SD=9.44). Similar results were found for the 
second wave of participants, with the high-BPD participants scoring significantly higher 
(M=63 . 55 ,  SD=8.45) than the low-BPD group (M=56.20, SD=5 .85), F(l ,  2 1 )= 5 .253 , p=.03 . 
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Combining Wave I and ll 
In order to determine that the two waves of participants were not significantly different 
from each other and therefore able to be combined for additional analysis, a one-way ANOVA 
was done to compare the scores of the low-BPD participants in wave I versus wave II, and the 
high-BPD participants in wave I versus wave II. There were no significant differences between 
the wave I high-BPD group and the wave II high-BPD group on any of the dependent variables, 
except for the BIS- 1 1 (see Table 4). High-BPD participants in wave I scored higher (M=73 . 64, 
SD=14 .07) than high-BPD individuals in wave II (M=65 .83 ,  SD=8.72) on the BIS- 1 1 ,  F( 1 ,  
39)=4.20, p=.047. Despite this significance, the strength of the relationship was not very strong, 
with an effect size of 0 . 1 0, only 1 0% of the variance. There was no significant difference 
between the wave I low-BPD group and the wave II low-BPD group on any of the dependent 
variables (see Table 5). Therefore, the two waves of participants were combined, resulting in 24 
low-BPD individuals and 26 high-BPD individuals and a total of 50 participants. 
Combined Analysis 
A one-way between-subjects MANOV A was again used to examine the differences 
between the low-BPD and high-BPD groups on delay discounting tasks for monetary and social 
incentives (k values), the Go Stop Impulsivity Paradigm (inhibition percentage), and the BIS- 1 1  
(total scores). Again Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for each group on each 
dependent variable. 
As was found for each separate wave, no differences were found between groups in 
monetary or social discounting. High-BPD individuals did not discount monetary rewards 
(M=25 .38, SD=56.22) more steeply than low-BPD individuals (M=8.63, SD=23 . 8 1 ), 
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F(1 ,49)=1 . 83 ,  p=. 1 8, nor did they discount social rewards (M=58 .05 ,  SD=1 1 6.45) at a 
significantly greater rate than low-BPD individuals (M=67.77, SD= l 80 .2 1 ), F( l ,49)=.05, p=. 82. 
Differences between monetary and social discounting within groups were also analyzed 
using a repeated-measures t-test. High-BPD individuals did not discount monetary (M=25 . 38, 
SD= 56 .22) and social rewards (M=58 .05, SD=l l 6. 45) differently, 1(25)=- 1 .23, p=.23 . 
Similarly, low-BPD participants did not discount social rewards (M=67.77, SD= l 80.2 1 )  at a 
greater rate than monetary rewards (M=8 .63 ,  SD=23 . 8 1 ), 1(23)=- 1 .685, p=. l l . 
In addition, a 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA was done with group (high or low) as the 
between-subjects independent variable and discounting (monetary and social) as the repeated 
measures dependent variable. The main effect for discounting was significant, F(l ,  49)=4 .44, 
p=.04 .  The main effect for group was not significant, F(l ,  49)=.024, p=.88 .  There was no 
significant interaction between group and discounting, F(l ,  48)=.37, p=.5 5 . 
On the GoStop, there was no significant difference between the high- and low-BPD 
groups in their ability to inhibit responses at 1 50msec, (M=61 .73, SD=25 . 84 and M=56.46, 
SD=22. 72 respectively), F(l ,49)=.58, p=.45 .  
Again, there was a significant difference between the high and low-BPD participants on 
the BIS- 1 1 when the two groups were combined. The High-BPD group scored significantly 
higher (1vi=68 . 38, SD=l l .94) than the low-BPD g1oup (�v1=58 . 54, SD=8.24), F(l ,  49)=1 1 . 33 ,  
. 002. 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to increase understanding of impulsivity in a subclinical 
population of those with borderline personality disorder traits. Though previous studies had not 
found reward-delay impulsivity in those with BPD or BPD traits using delay discounting, the 
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present study examined whether changing the reinforcer used in the delay discounting task to one 
social in nature would heighten impulsivity for high-BPD individuals. It was hypothesized that 
high-BPD individuals would not discount monetary incentives a significantly greater rate than 
their low-BPD counterparts. It was also hypothesized, however, that high-BPD participants 
would in fact discount social incentives at a significantly steeper rate compared to low-BPD 
participants (showing greater impulsivity) . In addition, high-BPD participants would discount 
social rewards at significantly greater rate than they did monetary rewards .  To supplement the 
investigation of impulsivity in this sample, the GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm, a laboratory 
measure used to evaluate response-inhibition, and the BIS- 1 1 ,  a self-report measure of 
impulsivity, were also used. It was hypothesized that the high-BPD group would display greater 
difficulty inhibiting responses (greater impulsivity) on the GoStop compared to the low-BPD 
group. Additionally, it was hypothesized that high-BPD individuals would report higher levels 
of impulsivity than the low-BPD group on the BIS- 1 1 .  
As was found in previous research (Dom et al. ,  2006) it was expected that there would be 
no difference between low-BPD and high-BPD individuals in discounting rates of monetary 
incentives. The present study replicated results found by Dom et al. (2006) and increased 
confidence that there is no difference between groups in delay discounting of monetary rewards. 
In addition, these results extend this knowledge to a different population, since college students 
with BPD traits were used in the present study while a. population of abstinent alcoholic inpatient 
individuals with personality disorders was used in the previous study. 
Though it was not surprising that the two groups did not discount monetary incentives 
differently, the present study hypothesized that there would be a significant difference between 
low-BPD and high-BPD individuals in discounting rates of social reinforcement. Further, it was 
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expected that the high-BPD group would discount social rewards at a greater rate than they did 
monetary rewards. Unfortunately, neither hypothesis was confirmed. High-BPD participants did 
not discount social rewards more rapidly than low-BPD participants, nor did high-BPD 
individuals discount social incentives at a significantly greater rate than monetary rewards.  
Several explanations exist for these results. First, it is possible that the kind of the 
incentive used does not matter and that using a different reinforcer does not heighten impulsivity. 
However, given the dearth of research showing that the several variables related to the reinforcer 
do affect impulsivity, this explanation seems unlikely. As previously mentioned, preference for 
the reinforcer, time of delivery, and whether the reinforcer is primary or secondary in nature all 
impact impulsivity (Forzano & Logue, 1 994; Forzano & Logue, 1 995; Odum & Rainaud, 2003). 
Another possible explanation is that a delay discounting task does not measure 
impulsivity in the BPD population. The fact that using a social incentive still did not result in 
different rates of discounting for high-BPD individuals adds to the existing evidence that the 
kind of impulsivity present in BPD is not one of reward-delay, but more likely one of response 
inhibition (Dom et al., 2006; Hochhausen et al . ,  2002; Rubio et al. , 2007). 
It is also possible that a delay discounting task for loss may be more likely to find 
significant differences between groups in delay discounting than the delay discounting task for 
gains used in this study. Such a task would be similar to the delay discounting task for gains, but 
participants would be losing money either immediately or at a delay instead of being paid that 
hypothetical amount of money (e.g. losing $500 now or losing $ 1 000 in week and so on). Due to 
the presence of negative affects, negative cognitions and fear of abandonment in BPD (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2007; Zanarini et al. ,  1 998a), those with 
BPD or BPD traits may be more sensitive to delay when presented with hypothetical loss of 
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reinforcers. Delay discounting for loss of reinforcers may therefore result in a better measure of 
impulsivity in BPD. Future research could explore this possibility. 
A fourth possibility as to why there is no difference between groups in delay discounting 
of social incentives is the incentive itself The first problem is that it is unclear how to define 
social reinforcement. As previously mentioned, past research has defined social reinforcement in 
several ways, including physical touch, verbal interaction, eye-contact, and time with others, 
(Jerome & Sturmey, 2008; Milby, 1 970; Pelaez-Nogueras et al. ,  1 996). Clearly, social 
reinforcement could be interpreted numerous ways, and perhaps hypothetical "time with others" 
was not a clear operational definition. The second difficulty with the social incentive used in the 
present study is that it is very different from money and does not have a definite or explicit 
monetary value as do drugs, alcohol or food. No previous research has attempted to equate time 
with others to money, and the method used in the present study could be flawed. The fact that 
more social discounting data than monetary discounting data was excluded due to inconsistent 
responding lends credence to these explanations. Fifteen ( 65 .2o/o) of the 23 excluded data points 
were social discounting. Additionally, the fact the variability in the discounting rates of social 
rewards was so vast also suggests that the reinforcer may not have translated well. The social 
discounting standard deviations for both high and low-BPD groups were unusually large, larger 
than those for the monetary discounting task. This variability may also account for why there 
was no significant difference within the groups, despite the fact that the social discounting means 
were larger than the monetary discounting means in each group. Given this evidence, it seems 
probable that either the method used to equate "time with others" to money was flawed, or "time 
with others" was not an ideal representation of a social reinforcer, or even both. Further research 
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could investigate other possible social reinforcers, or a different method to better equate the 
social reinforcer with its monetary counterpart. 
Despite the fact that there were no significant differences between or within groups on 
the two discounting tasks, there was a significant main effect for discounting. Overall, 
participants discounted more steeply on the social discounting task than on the monetary 
discounting task. This may be because a social reinforcer, such as time with a loved one, could 
be considered a primary reinforcer, while money is a secondary reinforcer. As previously 
mentioned, Odum and Rainaud (2003) found similar results when they investigated discounting 
in individuals without a history of alcohol abuse or gambling; participants in that study 
discounted food and alcohol at a similar rate, and they discounted both more steeply than they 
did money. This was attributed to the fact that food and alcohol are primary reinforcers, while 
money is secondary. Similarly, Petry (200 1 )  found that, though participants with alcohol 
problems discounted both money and alcohol more steeply than controls, as well as discounting 
alcohol more steeply than money, controls also discounted alcohol more steeply than money. 
This same phenomenon could be at work here, which would explain why all participants, 
regardless of high or low-BPD status, discounted social rewards more steeply than monetary 
incentives. 
Despite the expectation that high-BPD individuals would have more difficulty inhibiting 
responses on the Go Stop Impulsivity Paradigm, results of the present study did not support this 
hypothesis or the past research which showed that those with BPD struggle with response­
inhibition impulsivity (Chapman et al. ,  2008; Dom et al. ,  2006; Hochhausen et al., 2002). This 
could be due to the fact that the two groups were not different enough, especially since the cut­
scores used to create the groups were lower than originally planned. However, the fact that the 
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BIS- 1 1 stil l  showed significant difference between the two groups on impulsivity makes this 
explanation less likely. Another possibility for the disparate results is that the previous 
researchers employed different tasks to measure response-inhibition impulsivity, including 
passive avoidance learning tasks (Chapman et al. ,  2008; Hochhausen et al. ,  2002) and the go/no­
go task (Dom et al . ,  2006). Though all three tasks have similarities and intend to measure the 
same aspect of impulsivity, the slight differences in the tasks may account for the unexpected 
results in the present study. The populations used in the previous three studies were also unlike 
the population in the current study. Though Chapman et al. (2008) also studied a non-clinical 
population, they utilized a different measure to create the high- and low-BPD groups (the PAI­
BOR; Morey, 1 99 1  ). Both Dom et al. (2006) and Hochhausen et al. (2002) studied clinical 
populations in their research. Either of these factors, or the combination of the two, could 
explain why the present study did not replicate results showing difficulties in response-inhibition 
impulsivity. 
As found in previous studies of impulsive populations, including BPD (Cherek et al, 
1 997; Dougherty et al., 1999; Ferrez et al. , 2009), high-BPD individuals were expected to score 
significantly higher on the BIS- 1 1 than their low-BPD counterparts .  Results from the present 
study did in fact show that high-BPD participants reported being more impulsive than the low­
BPD individuals on the BIS- 1 1 .  This shows that even subclinical populations ofborderline 
individuals differ on self-reported trait impulsivity. This also increases confidence that the BPQ 
accurately discriminated between groups, even when different cut-scores were used. 
Because of the importance of impulsivity and fear of abandonment in the borderline 
personality diagnosis, this study aimed to increase understanding of both aspects BPD. Though 
previous research supported difficulties with inhibition impulsivity in the BPD population 
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(Chapman et al. ,  2008; Dom et aL, 2006 ;  Hochhausen et 2002), research using delay 
discounting and other reward-delay impulsivity tasks had yet to find delay-reward impulsivity in 
BPD (Dom et al . ,  2006; Dougherty et al. ,  1 999; Rubio et al. ,  2007). The present study is no 
exception. Because research supports differences in impul�ivity as a function of the specific 
reinforcer used (Forzano & Logue, 1 995 ;  Odum & Rainaud, 2003), it seemed necessary to 
examine reinforcers that may be more salient for those with BPD in order to more completely 
assess reward-delay impulsivity in BPD. The lack of significant results, however, suggests that 
those with BPD traits are not impulsive on delay discounting tasks regardless of the reinforcer. 
Barring further research, the present study adds to the evidence that nature of impulsivity in 
those with BPD is more likely one of response-inhibition and not reward-delay impulsivity. 
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23 1 1 9  F 3 Lo 46 70 1 03 .9 1 12 a 
40 1 2 1  M 43 Hi 6 1  25 0 .5878 397. 8779 
4 1  1 24 M 5 1  Hi 78 b b 1 8 . 2475 
42 1 1 9  F 44 Hi 68 50  1 . 2846 0 .0 1 86 
49 1 23 F 59 Hi 87 75 1 . 1 2 1 9  28. 5457 
58  1 1 9  F 2 Lo 75 55 0. 5648 26.6429 
79 1 1 8  F 4 Lo 5 1  3 5  0 .6 1 52 3 . 1 900 
8 1  1 20 M 39  Hi 8 1  5 5  6 .23 8 1  a 
88 1 2 1  F 54 Hi 66 80 0.6807 a 
1 07 1 2 1  F 3 5  Hi 82 60 0.3 5 1 1  0 . 5 1 97 
1 08 1 1 9  F 3 Lo 5 1  95 0.4497 5 . 1 270 
1 1 0 1 24 F 3 Lo 56 45 2 .7456 6 .290 1 
1 14 1 23 F 4 Lo 72 80 2. 1 53 9  a 
1 1 7 1 2 1  F 54 Hi 96 70 a a 
1 2 1  1 1 9  F 47 Hi 64 95 0 . 59 1 5  2 . 5407 
1 3 1  1 2 1  F 3 5  Hi 84 1 00 8 . 1 85 1  1 60 .0222 
1 3 2  1 1 9  F 4 1  50  60 4 . 1 48 1 1 3 . 0452 
1 34 1 20 F 2 Lo 59 80 0.26 14  1 .4539 
1 3 6  1 20 F 1 Lo 49 40 0 .0242 0 . 5 1 52 
1 3 7  1 20 F 2 60 85  9.3 339  7. 3 1 92 
1 40 1 20 F 40 Hi 56  30  0.0097 9 .7937 
1 46 1 1 9  F 4 Lo 6 1  90 0.3 6 1 4  a 
1 48 1 2 1  F 40 Hi 95  2. 1 8 1 1 2 . 7867 
1 52 1 22 F 6 1  Hi 9 1  50  5 .440 1 a 
1 7 1  1 1 9  F 36  Hi 75 20 a a 
1 74 1 1 8  M 3 3  Hi 8 1  25 3 .4940 a 
1 8 1  1 1 8  F 52 Hi 79 80 1 . 3322 6 . 8663 
1 97 1 2 1  F 3 Lo 67 70 1 .3 6 1 3  1 7 . 3 140 
206 1 1 9  F 2 54 50  0 .0003 0 .7476 
223 1 20 F 3 3  Hi 72 80 2. 3409 3 .46 1 0  
234 1 22 F 2 Lo 63 40 b 0.0227 
247 1 1 9  F 40 Hi 95  60  57 .7482 6 .4705 
250 1 1 9  M 6 1  Hi 82  80 7 .0095 a 
252 1 2 1  F 5 Lo 67 20 1 . 3420 a 
276 1 1 8  F 5 Lo 72 65 0 .2077 8 . 6833 
,... 0 ')  ,... 1 1\  F "') Q  u; .c; Q  75  0 .0 1 74 0 .0100 L.O:> L., 1 7  "'- 0  .L .L.L ..J V  
290 2 1 8  F 4 Lo 67 95 0 .25 1 4  a 
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Table 1 Continued 
Participant Demographics and Scores 
Participant Wave Age Gender BPQ Hi!Lo BIS l l GoStop l 50 DDmoney DDSocial 
291 2 22 M 0 Lo 52 20 0 .8 14 1  2.2065 
293 2 2 1  F 26 Hi 72 45 0 . 3367 8 .6503 
296 2 1 8  F 3 Lo 49 65 2 .3095 a 
3 0 1  2 1 8  M 2 Lo 60 3 5  0. 1 308 8 .0 148 
303 2 34 F 1 Lo 58  75  a a 
305 2 1 8  F 4 Lo 59  45  0 .0688 1 . 1 302 
3 1 3 2 1 8  F 47 Hi 53  95 3 .3 772 4. 544 1 
3 14 2 1 8  F 3 5  Hi 53 60 23 .6 1 1 2 0. 1 680 
3 1 6 2 1 8  F 46 Hi 60 30  20.4738 a 
3 1 8 2 1 8  M 26 Hi 6 1  5 5  a 1 . 5844 
325 2 1 8  F 26 Hi 54 3 5  3 .3 872 16 . 5522 
3 29 2 1 9  F 1 Hi 60 80 0 .3247 1 . 3840 
3 3 3  2 1 8  F 1 Lo 5 1  50  0.0746 1 8 .448 1 
3 34 2 1 8  F 3 0  Hi 73 5 5  a a 
3 3 9  2 1 8  F 3 5  Hi 64 25 0 .0985 2 1 .63 16 
344 2 2 1  F 3 Lo 62 50  2 .7 1 53 1 5 .7370 
3 52 2 1 8  F 30  Hi 73 65 a a 
3 56 2 1 8  F 1 Lo 60 3 5  1 . 5 1 89 23 .296 1 
3 5 8  2 1 8  F 1 Lo 5 5  90 59 . 8032 1 3 3 .08 1 1 3  
3 59 2 1 9  F 26 Hi 64 3 0  a 0. 1 520 
3 60 2 1 8  F 4 Lo 54 80 0 . 1 540 57 .88 1 3  
369 2 1 8  F 3 Hi 7 1  90 1 . 5842 1 . 1 1 96 
377 2 1 9  F 3 2  Hi 69 90 1 56 .2984 7 .6037 
3 83 2 1 8  F 3 Lo 64 80 a 82. 8 10 1  
3 8 5  2 1 8  F 29 Hi 77 60 1 14 .6947 3 . 5656 
390 2 1 8  M 27 Hi 84 5 0  b 1 5 .995 1 
4 1 3  2 1 8  F 3 56 65 2.7857 a 
42 1 2 1 9  F 0 Lo 45 3 0  0 .0280 27. 5258 
425 2 1 9  F 28 Hi 7 1  8 5  0.4594 a 
429 2 1 9  F 27 Hi 68 30  24. 1 078 3 14.9600 
430 2 1 8  F 3 Lo 64 85  1 8 .4078 860.4288 
excluded based on exclusion criteria (inconsistent responding) . 
hoata missing due to technical error in saving or retrieving of data. 
78 
Table 2 
Indifference Points and k Values for Monetary and Social Incentives 
1 
6 
14  
23 
40 
4 1  
42 
49 
58  
79 
8 1  
88 
1 07 
108 
1 1 0 
1 14 
1 1 7 
1 2 1  
Condition 1 wk 1 m o  6 mo 1 
Money 999 999 999 887 249 443 2 2 
Social 1 1 5 1 1 3 1 1  83 29 1 1 1 
Moneya 925 925 955 925 850 870 995 990 
Sociala 47 3 7  89 97 109 97  109 I l l  
Money 937 249 120 6 1 8  1 8  6 2 
Social 4 1  29 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Moneyb 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social a 
Money 
Social a 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Moneya 
Social a 
Money 
Social 
249 
1 3  
979 
1 3  
89  
749 
99 
74 1 
43 
995 
89 
937 
I l l  
826 
59 
596 
9 
995 
95 
870 
29 
909 
1 1 5 
937 
29 
999 
1 
905 
1 09 
249 
1 
850 
3 
43 
624 
99 
697 
47 
905 
25 
800 
99 
499 
57 
499 
9 
874 
93 
74 1 
87 
749 
1 0 1  
499 
3 5  
499 
1 
866 
99 
237 
1 09 
701 
7 
1 3  
467 
67 
499 
47 
826 
1 
49 1 
3 9  
499 
1 0 1  
499 
9 
846 
59 
!:' O r\  .J OV 
3 5  
499 
1 
483 
1 
1 24 
1 
499 
57  
1 20 30 54 
1 1 1 
600 499 249 
3 1 1 
1 1 
479 377 249 
99 39 27 
45 1 443 252 
47 47 1 5  
487 425 409 
3 
49 1 
33  
62 
43 
1 
487 
1 
1 1 2 
57 
1 
1 
3 0  
1 1 5 
495 455 405 
9 9 1 1  
697 499 405 
89 49 49 
572 580 3 54 
25 59 1 1  
249 50 3 0  
1 1 1 
495 249 3 0  
1 1 1 
874 995 995 
49 97 1 05 
499 49 1 437 
3 1  1 1 
79 
14  
1 
1 00 
1 
1 
249 
1 1 5 
1 93 
1 
3 0  
1 
249 
1 
96 
59 
3 93 
1 5  
1 87 
1 3  
296 
1 1  
1 24 
1 
2 
1 
995 
87 
201 
3 
1 4  
1 
50  
1 
1 
3 8  
1 1 5 
50  
1 
1 24 
1 
OAf\ ovv 
1 
2 
1 
245 
1 9  
1 55 
1 
1 11 '7 
.L o t 
7 
1 12 
1 
2 
1 
2 
87 
252 
1 
0 .4 1 00 0 .92 
0 .6727 0 .95 
0 .0022 0 .28 
0 .004 1 0 . 3 1 
1 7 .9458 0 .93 
74. 1 2 1 9  0 .90 
1 03 .9 1 12  0 .43 
286. 1 1 3 8  0 .00 
0 .5878 0 .96 
397.8779 0 .78 
1 8 .2475 0 .99 
1 .2846 0 .88 
366.367 1  0 .06 
1 . 1 2 1 9  0 .90 
28. 5457 0 . 1 6  
0 .5648 0 .92 
26.4296 0 .96 
0 .61  
3 . 1 900 0 .99 
6.23 8 1  0 .86 
0 . 1 59 1  0 . 14 
0 .6807 0 .76 
470.5 1 82 0 . 1 0  
0. 3 5 1 1 0. 84 
0. 5 1 97 0.98 
0.4497 0 .89 
5. 1 270 0.25 
2 .7456 0 .97 
6 .2901 0 .93 
2. 1 0. 83 
1 03 .0852 0 .61  
0 .05442 0.09 
1697. 648 0.3 5  
0 . 59 1 5  0 .84 
2. 5407 0 .99 
Table 2 Continued 
Indifference Points and k Values for Monetary and Social Incentives 
1 3 1 
1 3 2  
1 3 4  
1 3 6  
1 3 7  
140 
146 
148 
1 52 
1 7 1  
1 74 
Condition 1 wk 1 mo 6 mo 1 
Money 729 4 1 7  284 534  1 3 9  22 
Social 29 5 5 1 1 1 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social a 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social a 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
999 
1 I 5 
987 
4 1  
995 
97 
752 
89 
999 
1 09 
852 
1 
967 
1 1 5 
9 1 3  
1 
1 87 
1 09 
870 
43 
987 
49 
983 
79 
99 1 
93 
752 
5 9  
983 
7 1  
92 1 
1 
967 
57 
639 
59  
3 0  
1 
784 
53  
249 1 0  14  1 2  
1 I I 1 
499 499 499 499 
57 5 7  27 27 
983 975 971 947 
87 68  59 29 
6 6 2 2 
59 1 1 1 
874 874 874 874 
1 1 1 1 
752 5 64 502 
1 3  1 5  87 59 
499 249 
93 1 
24 1 248 
1 1 
62 2 
62 1 24 
1 7  3 
1 4  1 83 
1 1 
2 2 
5 7  1 1 1 
330  229 1 24 1 24 
1 9  3 7  1 1 
2 
1 
1 0  
1 
499 
27 
939 
25 
2 
I 
877 
1 
14  
29 
2 
1 
26 
7 
2 
1 
1 24 
1 
2 8 . 1 85 1  0 .67 
1 1 60 .0222 0 .97 
1 0  
1 
499 
27 
502 
9 
2 
1 
874 
1 
2 
27 
2 
1 
58  
1 1 5 
2 
1 
6 
75 
4 . 148 1 0 .95 
1 3 .0452 0 .96 
0 .26 1 4  0.44 
1 .4539 0. 56 
0 .0242 0 .83 
0 . 5 1 52 0 .96 
9 .3339 0 .9 1  
7 . 3 1 92 0 . 84 
0 .0097 0 . 10  
9. 7937 0 .97 
0 . 36 14 0 . 89 
2078 . 1 32 0 .23 
2 . 1 8 1 1 0 .98 
2 .7866 0 . 72 
5 .440 1  0 .96 
294. 5882 0 .02 
230 .762 1 0 .90 
2 1 . 54 1 6  0.6 1  
3 .4940 0 .99 
1 8 1  Money 905 874 499 1 24 443 439 487 1 00 
3 5 .2 1 75 0 . 1 2  
1 .3322 0 . 59 
6 . 8663 0 .87  
1 .3 6 1 3  0 .99 1 97 
206 
223 
234 
247 
250 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Moneyb 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social a 
67 
999 
69 
999 
95 
7 1 7  
57 
1 1 1  
8 5  
97 1 
43 
995 
43 
7 1 7  
79 
1 1 1  
425 252 
87 5 7  
689 627 
29 43 
1 5  3 1 3  
5 10 479 1 89 1 43 
43 29 1 1  1 
999 995 991 995 
4 1  5 7  49 85  
439 3 89 1 67 1 3 5  
3 9  3 7  3 3  25 
99 1 07 99 89 
62 1 0  
43 27 
288 22 1 
1 1 5 1 5  
80 
2 
1 9  
3 0  
7 
2 
1 9  
3 0  
9 
7 
64 
I 
995 
1 3  
1 08 
25 
87 
2 
1 3  
2 
59  
1 
1 0  
1 
995 
1 3  
1 08 
1 3  
87 
2 
1 5  
2 
57  
1 7.3 1 39 0 .77 
0 .0003 0 .0 1  
0 .7476 0.27 
2 .3408 0 .98 
3 .46 10  0 .80 
0 .0226 0.63 
57 .7482 0 .95 
6 .4705 0 .96 
7.0095 0 .95 
1 . 7068 0 .0 1  
Table 2 Continued 
Indifference Points and k Values for Monetary and Social Incentives 
252 
276 
283 
290 
29 1 
293 
296 
3 0 1  
3 03 
305 
3 1 3 
3 14 
3 1 6 
3 1 8 
325 
329 
333  
334 
Condition 1 wk 1 mo 6 mo 1 
Money 979 877 745 499 2 2 
1 Social 1 1 3 29 59  1 1 
Money 
Social 
Money 
social 
money 
Social a 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Sociae 
money 
social 
Moneya 
Social a 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social a 
Moneya 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Moneya 
Social a 
999 
1 1 5 
999 
1 1 5 
995 
1 2 1  
979 
1 1 7 
97 1 
95 
975 
9 1  
999 
1 1 5 
933 
1 2 1  
749 
1 1 7 
749 
93 
49 1 
1 2 1  
725 
3 7  
475 
1 19 
987 
9 1  
983 
89 
983 
99 
995 
3 1  
967 
47 
999 
1 1 5 
995 
6 1  
729 
97 
987 
57  
889 
83 
999 
85  
959 
59 
97 1 
97 
749 
1 1 9 
467 
1 2 1  
296 
6 1  
233 
25 
624 
3 9  
995 
6 1  
800 
45 
90 1 
99 
90 1 
25 
909 
1 1 5 
995 
3 1  
624 
57  
74 1 
5 3  
475 
5 7  
8 5 0  
7 
970 
57 
499 
1 1 5 
40 1 
1 
1 24 
1 2 1  
1 24 
67  
5 02 
1 1 7 
487 
23  
862 
99 
749 
1 
475 
1 3  
749 499 49 1 
29 1 3  1 1  
933 909 847 
1 09 1 07 1 05 
995 499 502 
3 1  1 5  1 1 5 
487 425 225 
4 1  1 9  9 
624 499 5 1 8  
1 1  1 1 
1 89 1 00 1 08 
2 1  97 1 1 7  
749 675 600 
1 1 1 
970 479 47 1 
87 87 97 
999 939 987 
29 25 1 7  
2 1 7  1 4  
45 1 
1 89 62 
1 2 1  1 2 1  
209 98 
25 59 
34 252 
1 1  7 
40 1 
249 
1 7  
54 
9 1  
3 
1 97 1 00 80 
3 1  3 1  1 5  
752 752 249 
6 1  7 7 
74 1 697 689 
1 I 1 
95 1 1 00 1 24 
1 3  7 1 19 
81 
2 
1 
45 1 
1 1  
800 
1 05 
1 24 
1 1 5 
229 
1 
249 
I 
96 
1 1 5  
502 
1 
47 1 
1 03 
5 14 
5 
1 4  
1 
249 
4 1  
752 
6 1  
788 
1 2 1  
3 0  
9 
92 
1 
564 
1 
600 
1 19 
2 
1 
249 
1 5  
752 
1 05 
80  
1 1 9 
1 00 
1 
1 00 
1 
749 
2 1  
3 00 
1 
47 1 
57  
233 
1 3  
2 
1 
249 
3 1  
1 20 
89 
3 77 
6 1  
34  
7 
64 
1 
564 
1 
999 
1 1 5 
1 . 3420 0.95 
1 1 . 5 1 98 0 .74 
0 .2077 0 .95 
8 .6833 0 .90 
0 .0 1 74 0 .84 
0 .0 1 00 0 .47 
0.25 14  0 .95 
0 .01 1 1  0 .08 
0 . 8 14 1  0 .94 
2.2065 1 . 00 
0 .3367 0 .94 
8 .6503 0 .87 
2 .3095 0 .56 
0 .0623 0 .02 
0 . 1 308 0 .95 
8 .0 148 0 .97 
0 . 1464 0 .76 
0 .0477 0 .03 
0 .0688 0 .43 
1 1 3 02 0 .85 
3 .3772 0 .82 
4 .544 1 0 .80 
23 .6 1 12  0.67 
0 . 1680 0 .73 
20.4738 0 .3 1 
0 . 1 3 63 0.40 
36.6050 () (\() v . vv 
1 . 5844 0 .06 
3 .3 872 0 .95 
0 .86 
0 .3247 0 .92 
1 .3 840 0 .75 
0 .0745 0 .69 
1 8.448 1 0. 98 
0 .3962 0.09 
6 .7586 0 .04 
Table 2 Continued 
Indifference Points and k Values for Monetary and Social Incentives 
3 3 9  
344 
352 
356 
358  
359  
3 60 
3 69 
377 
3 83 
385 
390 
4 1 3  
42 1 
425 
429 
430 
Condition 1 wk 1 mo 6 mo 1 
Money 999 987 95 1 943 499 752 749 
Social 1 2 1  1 5  1 1 1 1 1 
Money 999 995 437 1 04 1 00 1 00 1 0  
Social 9 1  4 1  1 5  6 1  1 I 
Moneya 95 1 499 502 54 14  42 50 
Sociala 15 5 1 2 1  1 1 1 1 2 1  
Money 983 97 1 764 249 1 00 5 8  1 0  
Social 1 2 1  9 1 1 1 1 1 
Money 502 1 00 22 3 0  3 0  26 22 
Social 3 1 1 5  1 7 1 1 1 
Moneya 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Moneya 
Social 
Money 
Social 
Moneyb 
Money 
Social a 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social a 
Money 
Social 
Money 
Social 
72 1 
1 07 
999 
6 1  
995 
1 1 9 
147 
3 7  
937 
47 
99 
7 1 3  
97 
999 
1 1 5 
999 
999 
1 5  
999 
7 
40 1 
1 2 1  
995 
1 5  
749 
1 07 
346 
1 2 1  
225 
1 5  
2 1 3  
99 
6 1  
749 
23 
95 1 
905 
59 
50  
9 
1 24 
1 
30  
1 07 
874 
1 
499 
93 
5 8  
1 
1 24 
1 
62 
6 1  
1 
20 1 
27 
75 1 
1 
499 
3 
9 
5 
1 5 1  
1 
1 0  64 68  
1 1 6 91  6 1  
499 995 995 
1 1 1 
40 1 20 1 249 
75 l 
64 14  2 
1 3  3 23 
62 3 0  6 0  
1 1 1 
1 79 1 00 1 1 6 
5 3 9 
1 1 
499 24 1 249 
2 1  1 3  95 
756 752 752 
1 1 
99 1 499 249 
1 1  1 
14  12  30  
23 1 1 
1 5 1  1 24 1 89 
1 1 1 
64 
6 1  
2 
1 
1 5 1  
1 
92 
1 5  
1 00 
1 
3 0  
1 
1 
1 24 
1 1 3 
752 
1 
1 4  
3 1  
1 8  
1 
1 24 
1 
aData excluded based on exclusion criteria (inconsistent resoonding). 
hoata missing due to technical error in savi�g or retrieving �f data�, 
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124 0 .0985 0 .  74 
1 21 .63 16  0 . 87 
2 2 .71 53 0 .96 
l 1 5 .73 70 0 . 68 
2 5 .7978 0 . 88 
1 2 1  233 . 8883 0 . 09 
1 0  1 . 5 1 89 0 .96 
1 23 .2961 0 . 84 
38  59. 8032 0 .96 
1 1 3 3 .08 1 1 0 . 79 
50 
3 
2 
1 
96 
1 
88 
1 
1 08 
1 
14  
1 
1 
80 
93 
752 
1 
84 
1 5  
50  
1 
20 1 
1 
1 9 .8446 0 .97 
0. 1 520 0 . 9 1  
0 . 1 540 0 . 57 
57 .88 1 3  0 .98 
1 . 5842 0 .97 
1 . 1 1 96 0 .94 
1 56.2984 0 . 1 8  
7 .6037 0 .4 1  
1 8 . 1 1 1 6 0 . 88 
82. 8 1 0 1  1 . 00 
1 14.6947 0 .55  
3 .5656 0 .93 
1 5 .995 1 0 .97 
2.7857 0 .79 
1 9 .0664 0 . 0 1  
0 .0280 0 .23 
27. 5258 0 . 8 1 
0 .4594 0 .80 
1 5 . 996 0 .82 
24. 1 078 0 . 8 1 
3 14 .96 0. 1 9  
1 8 .4078 0 .72 
860.4288 0 .95 
Table 3 
Overall Mean and Standard f)eviations 
Wave II 
M SD M SD M SD 
DDmoney 22. 14  59. 56 29 .80 53 . 83 25 . 33  56.22 
DDsocial 50 .86 1 04 .72 34 . 5 6  93 .26 58 .05  1 16 .45 
GoStop 1 50 6 1 . 3 3  26.89 62.27 25 .63 6 1 . 73 25 .84 
BIS- 1 1  7 1 . 93 1 3 . 10 63 . 5 5  8 .45 68 . 3 8  1 1 .94 
Low-BPD Low-BPD Low-BPD 
M SD M SD M SD 
DDmoney 8 . 8 1  27.47 8 . 3 7  1 8 .93 8 .63 23 . 8 1  
DDsocial 34 . 1 9  77.20 1 14.7 7  264.92 67.77 1 80 .21  
GoStop 1 50 59 .64 2 1 . 6 1  52 .00 24. 63 56.46 22.72 
BIS- 1 1 .C:..f'l ,., 1 9 .44 56 .20 ' Q ' 'Q '.A 8 .24 VV . .k .l  .J . U ..J ..J V . J "I" 
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Table 4 
One-Way ANOVA within High-BPD Groups 
DDmoney 
DDsocial 
GoStop 1 50 
BIS- 1 1  
Wave I 
1 8 . 50 
48 .82 
62.86 
73 . 64 
53 .04 
1 0 1 .49 
23 .48 
1 4.07 
26.83  
28 .42 
58 . 6 1  
65 . 83 
Wave II 
84 
29.84 
82. 77 
23 .25 
8 .72 
1 
1 
I 
I 
.200 
. 3 57  
. 320 
4 .202 
.658 
. 555 
. 575 
.047 
Table 5 
One-way ANOVA within Low-BPD Groups 
Wave I Wave II 
M SD M SD df F p 
BIS- 1 1 60.44 8 . 82 57.07 6. 1 5  1 1 . 5 1  .230 
GoStop 1 50 60. 3 1 22. 1 7  60.00 23 . 9 1  1 .00 1 .970 
DDmoney 8 .25 26. 57  6 .85  1 6.65 1 . 027 .87 1  
DDsocial 3 1 .9 1  74. 9 1  1 1 1 . 87 2 .52 1 1 . 3 7  .253 
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Appendix A 
Participant #: -------
Instructions: Please put a circle around the response that you feel best DESCRIBES YOUR USUAL 
SELF (for the past two years or longer) in relation to each statement. Circle T if you think the 
statement is true. Circle f if you think the statement is false. There are no right or wrong answers 
and there are no trick questions. Please respon d  as honestly as you can, but don't ponder to() 
long over each item. 
Please answer every question, even though sometimes you may find it hard to decide. 
1 .  I often d o  things without thinking them through. 
2 .  I often become depressed or anxious 'out of the blue'. 
3 .  People often leave me. 
4 .  I am rarely disappointed by  my friends. 
5 .  I feel inferior to other people. 
6.  I have threatened to hurt myself in the past 
7. I do not believe that I have the skil ls to do anything with my life. 
8.  I rarely get  angry at  other people. 
9. 
10.  I wil l  not h ave sex with someone unless I have known them for quite some time. 
1 1 . I sometimes feel anxious or irritable and become sad a few hours later. 
12 .  When people close to me die or leave me, I abandoned. 
1 3 .  I often exaggerate the potential of friendsh ips only to find out later that they wil l  not work out. 
14 .  I f  I were more l ike other people I would feel better about myself. 
1 5 .  I have deliberately tried to hurt myself without trying to kill myself. 
16 .  In general, my l ife is pretty boring. 
1 7 .  I frequently get into physical fights. 
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Circle one 
1 8 . People are sometimes out to get me. 
1 9. My friends have told me that my mood changes very quickly. 
20. I am afraid to spend time alone. 
2 1 .  People who seem trustworthy often d isappoint me. 
22 . I have made a suicide attempt in the past. 
23 . I often fee l  l ike I have nothing to offer others. 
24. I have trouble controlling my temper. 
25 . I can read other people's minds. 
26.  I have tried 'hard' street drugs (e.g. cocaine, heroin). 
2 7 .  My mood frequently alternates throughout the day between happiness, anger, anxiety and depression. 
28 . When my friends leave, I am confident I wil l  see them again .  
29.  My friends often disappoint me. 
3 0 .  I have cut myself on purpose. 
3 1 .  I often feel  lonely and deserted. 
3 2. I have no difficulty controll ing my temper. 
3 3 .  I sometimes see or hear things th at others cannot see or hear 
3 4 .  I t  is not unusual for me to have sex on the first date. 
3 5 .  I sometimes feel very sad but this  feeling can change quickly . 
3 6 .  People rrro down. 
3 7 .  I wish I could be more l ike some of my friends. 
3 8 .  I used to try to hurt myself to get attention. 
39. I am often different with different people in d ifferent situations so that sometimes I am not sure who I T F 
40. I easily become irritated 
4 1 .  Sometimes I can actually hear what other people are thinking. 
42. I get high on drugs whenever I feel l ike i t. 
43 . I rarely feel sad or anxious. 
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44. No one loves me. 
45 . When I trust people, they rarely d isappoint me. 
46. I feel that people would not l ike me if they really knew me well .  
4 7.  I get angry easily. 
48.  It is i mpossible to read others' minds. 
49. I sometimes feel very happy but this feeling can change quickly. 
5 0 .  I find i t  difficult to depend on others because they will not be there when I need them. 
5 1 . The relationships with people I care about have lots of ups and downs. 
52.  I feel comfortable acting l ike myself. 
5 3 .  I have never made an attempt to hurt myself. 
54.  I rarely feel lonely. 
5 5 .  I often find that the l ittlest thJngs make me angry. 
56.  Sometimes I can't tell between what is real and what I have i magined. 
57.  When I drink, I drink too much. 
5 8 .  I consider myself to be a moody person. 
59.  I have difficul ty developing relationships because people often abandon me. 
60. My friends are always there when I need them. 
6 1 .  I wish I were someone else. 
63 . When I am angry, I sometimes hit  objects and break them. 
64. I often receive speeding tickets. 
65 . I often fee l  l ike I am on an emotional 'roller coaster'. 
66. I feel  l ike my family has deserted me. 
67. I am very comfortable with who I am. 
68. I often do things i mpulsively. 
69. My l ife is without purpose. 
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F 
70. I am not sure what I want to do in the future. 
7 1  At times I eat so much that I am in pain or have to force myself to throw up. 
72. People tel l  me that I am a moody person. 
73 . The people I love often leave me. 
7 4 .  In  social situations, I often feel that others will see through me and realize that I don't have much to T F 
7 5 .  I have been in the hospital for trying to harm myself. 
7fJ. I often feel empty inside. 
77. Others often make me angry. 
7 8 .  I often become frantic when I think that someone I care about will leave me. 
79. I am confused about my long-term goals. 
80. Others say I 'm quick tempered. 
Tha n k  you for your ass istance 
Permission to use given by Amir Poreh, Ph.D on August 3rd, 2009 
Poreh, A. M., Rawlings, D . ,  Claridge, G. , Freeman, J. L. , Faulkner, C. ,  & Shelton, C. (2006). 
The BPQ :  A scale for the assessment of borderline personality based on DSM-IV criteria. 
Journal of Personality Disorder, 20(3), 247-260. 
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Appendix B 
Demographic Information for PSH 1 10 
Demographic Information Participant # __ _ 
Age: __ 
Gender (circle one) : Male Female 
Please indicate the hourly wage that you currently earn. If you do not currently work, indicate 
the hourly wage you earned at your most recent job :  $1�--_-...�11 hour. 
So that you can receive research credit in your Principles of Psychology course for your 
participation, please provide the following information: 
PSH 1 10 (circle one) Section 0 1 - Dr. Mulvaney, MWF 1 2:00 pm- 1 :00 pm 
Section 02- Dr. Lipko, TR 1 : 1 5 pm-2 :45 pm 
Section 03- Dr. Hobson, MWF 8 : 1 5 am-9 : 1 5 am 
Section 04- Dr. Mulvaney, MWF 1 :  1 5  pm-2: 1 5  pm 
Are you willing to be contacted by researchers for an additional study? Please note that your 
answer to this question will not affect your receiving 1 research credit for the study questionnaire 
you just completed. Also, if you are contacted about a future study, you will be free to choose, 
after hearing about the study, whether you would like to participate. In addition, if you 
participate a future study you will receive an additional research credit. 
Yes --
No 
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Appendix C 
Demographic Information for Other Psychology Courses 
Demographic Information 
Age: __ 
Gender (circle one): Male 
Participant # __ _ 
Female 
Please indicate the hourly wage that you currently earn. If you do not currently work, indicate 
the hourly wage you earned at your most recent job :  $ I  I !  hour. 
So that you can receive extra credit in one of your psychology classes for your participation, 
please provide the following information: 
Course # Course Title Course Instructor 
Are you willing to be contacted by researchers for an additional study? Please note that your 
answer to this question will not affect your receiving extra credit for the study questionnaire you 
just completed. Also, if you are contacted about a future study, you will be free to choose, after 
hearing about the study, whether you would like to participate. In addition, if you participate in a 
future study you will receive additional extra credit. 
Yes 
No 
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Appendix D 
Contact Information 
If you responded 'yes' to being contacted for a further study, please provide the follow 
information so that researchers can contact you: 
Name (Please print clearly) : -------'-"-'-------------
Phone # where you prefer to be reached _______________ _ 
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Appendix E 
BIS-ll  Participant # 
Directions: People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to 
measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and put an X on the 
appropriate circle on the right side of this page. Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
Answer quickly and honestly. 
0 0 0 0 
Rarely/Never Occasionally Often Almost Always/ Always 
1 .  I plan tasks carefully. 0 0 0 0 
2 .  I do things without thinking. 0 0 0 0 
3 .  I make-up my mind quickly .  0 0 0 0 
4 .  I am happy-go-lucky. 0 0 0 0 
5 .  I don't "pay attention."  0 0 0 0 
6. I have ' ' racing" thoughts. 0 0 0 0 
7. I plan trips well ahead of time. 0 0 0 0 
8 .  I am self controlled. 0 0 0 0 
9 .  I concentrate easily. 0 0 0 0 
1 0 . I save regularly. 0 0 0 0 
1 1 . I ' ' squirm" at plays or lectures.  0 0 0 0 
12. I am a careful thinker. 0 0 0 0 
1 3 .  I plan for job security. 0 0 0 0 
14 .  I say things without thinking. 0 0 0 0 
1 5 . I like to think about complex problems. 0 0 0 0 
I change jobs. 0 0 0 0 
1 7. I act ' on impulse.,., 0 0 0 0 
1 8 . I get easily bored when solving thought problems. 0 0 0 0 
1 9 . I act on the spur of the moment. 0 0 0 0 
20. I am a steady thinker. 0 0 0 0 
2 1 .  I change residences. 0 0 0 0 
I buy things on impulse. 0 0 
. I can only think about one thing at a time. 0 0 0 0 
24 . I change hobbies. 0 0 0 0 
25 . I spend or charge more than I earn. 0 0 0 0 
26. I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking. 0 0 0 0 
2 7. I am more interested in the present than the future. 0 0 0 0 
28.  I am restless at the theater or lectures .  0 0 0 0 
29. I like puzzles. 0 0 0 0 
3 0. I am future oriented. 0 0 0 0 
Permission to use given by Matthew S. Stanford, Ph.D on July 27th, 2009. 
Patton, J. H. , Stanford, M. S., & Barratt, S .  ( 1 995) . Factor structure of the barratt 
impulsiveness scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51 ( 6), 7 68-77 4.  
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Appendix F 
GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm Instructions 
54935 
54935 
63897 
For this task, you need to pay attention and 
rem em be r  n u mbers. This card shows you what 
the com p uter  screen wi l l  look l ike d u ring you r  
session.  Like you see o n  the card here, the 
n u mbers wil l  be black against a white 
backg ro u n d .  The five d igit n u m bers a ppear on 
the screen . . .  
. . .  one r ight after another. If the num bers 
match, l i ke this  one m atches the n u m ber you 
just saw . . .  then you sho u l d  dick the left mouse 
button1 but  only when the n u m ber you see is  
exactly the sam e  a s  the one just before it. 
If the n u m be rs do not m atch . . . ! ike this one 
d oesn't m atch the last one . .. then do not d ick 
the m ou s e  button. 
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28416 
Please Rest 
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O kay, th is  is  the i m porta nt part . . .  
Whenever you respond (or /(c l ic k" )  to a n u m ber, 
you must cl ick whi le that n u m be r  is still on the 
scre e n .  Cl icking after the n u m be r  disappea rs 
from the screen does not cou nt. 
Another im porta nt pa rt is that this task ca n be a 
l ittl e  tricky . . .  sometimes a n u m be r  that matches 
the one you just saw wi l l  cha n ge from black . . .  
. . .  to red . . .  
You do NOT cl ick for any n u m be r  that cha nges 
to red.  
So,  in  othe r  words, you c l ick the left mouse 
button when you see a m atch ing 
n u m ber. . .  but . . .  on ly i f  that n u m be r  does NOT 
turn red .  
F ina l ly, rem e m be r  to response to a n u m be r  
whi le i t  is still on the scre e n .  
D u ri ng you r  session you will have a short rest 
brea k. 
The scre e n  wil l  show you a m essage, sim i lar  to 
what you see on this ca rd that says "Please 
Rest'' . . .  do not leave the com puter monitor  
d u ring th is  t ime. 
Get Ready ! 
You Have Completed your 
Session ! 
Just before the e n d  of the break, a m essage wi l l  
tel l  you t o  "Get Ready". 
When you see th is  m essage, watch the s creen 
for the next p a rt of the session to start. 
You wi l l  do the s a m e  th ing d u ri ng a l l  parts of the 
session . . .  d i cking on the m atching n u mbers while 
they a re sti l l  o n  the s creen, as l ong as they don't 
turn red. 
lfs i mportant to be as a ccurate as possible 
during this task . .. d icking the m ouse when you 
a re supposed to, a nd NOT cl i cking the m ou se 
when you a re not su pposed to. 
This m essage w i l l  appear on the screen to tel l  
you w he n  your session i s  over. 
Do you h ave any questions? 
Dougherty, D. M., Mathias, C .  W., & Marsh, D. M. (2003). GoStop Impulsivity Paradigm 
(Version 1 .0) [Manual and software] . Houston, Texas: Neurobehavioral Research 
Laboratory and Clinic, University of Texas Health Science Center. 
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Appendix G 
Screening Session Consent Form for 1 1 0 
STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT 
The purpose of this research project is to examine different personality traits among college 
students. Four areas will be studied including emotions, thoughts, relationships and behaviors. 
This research project is also being conducted in order for Rachel D' Agostino to complete a 
Master' s Thesis for the Department of Psychology at the College at Brockport State University 
ofNew York. 
In order to participate in this study, your informed consent is required. You are being asked to 
make a decision whether or not to participate in the project. If you want to participate in the 
project, and agree with the statements below, please sign your name in the space provided at the 
end. You may change your mind at any time and leave the study without penalty, even after the 
study has begun. 
I understand that : 
1 .  My participation is voluntary, I have the right to refuse to answer any questions, and I 
may choose to end my participation at any time. Nonparticipation or discontinuation of 
participation will have no impact on my grades in PSH 1 10.  
2 .  My confidentiality is guaranteed. The consent form and contact information sheet 
containing my name will be kept separate from the questionnaires containing my participant 
number and will be locked in a secure place. Only the researcher will be able to connect my 
name to my questionnaires, which will only occur if I am chosen and agree to participate in 
future research. If any publication results from this research, I would not be identified by 
name. 
3 .  There will be no anticipated personal risks or benefits because of my participation in this 
project, the time to complete and perhaps a heightened 
awareness/ sensitivity to specific emotions, thoughts or behaviors. The benefit of my 
participation is that I will receive 1 research credit in the PSH 1 10 course. 
4. My participation involves completing an 80-item questionnaire and answering those items 
by circling either true or false. It is estimated that the survey will take less than 1 hour. 
5 .  Approximately 400 will take part study. The results will be used for the 
completion of a Master' s Thesis by the primary researcher. 
6. Data will be kept in a secure location in the faculty advisor' s laboratory where only the 
investigator and advisor will have access to it. Data, consent forms, and contact information 
will be separated before they are stored and will be destroyed by shredding when the research 
has been accepted and approved. 
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I am 1 8  years of age or older. I have read and understand the above statements.  All my questions 
about my participation in this study have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate 
in the study realizing I may withdraw without penalty at any time during the survey process. 
Signing and returning the consent form and questionnaire indicates my consent to participate. 
If you have any questions you may contact : 
Primary researcher 
Rachel D' Agostino, MA candidate 
Psychology Department 
 
F acuity Advisor 
Lori-Ann,B .  Forzano, Ph.D 
Psychology Department 
 
IRB Administrator 
Colleen Donaldson 
61h Floor Allen Administration Building 
 
PRINT 
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Appendix H 
Screening Session Consent Form for Other Psychology Courses 
STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT 
The purpose of this research project is to examine different personality traits among college 
students. Four areas will be studied including emotions, thoughts, relationships and behaviors. 
This research project is also being conducted in order for Rachel D' Agostino to complete a 
Master' s Thesis for the Department of Psychology at the College at Brockport State University 
of New York. 
In order to participate in this study, your informed consent is required. You are being asked to 
make a decision whether or not to participate in the project. If you want to participate in the 
project, and agree with the statements below, please sign your name in the space provided at the 
end. You may change your mind at any time and leave the study without penalty, even after the 
study has begun. 
I understand that : 
1 .  My participation is voluntary, I have the right to refuse to answer any questions, and I 
may choose to end my participation at any time. Nonparticipation or discontinuation of 
participation will have no impact on my grades in the psychology course for which I am 
completing this study. 
2 .  My confidentiality is guaranteed. The consent form and contact information sheet 
containing my name will be kept separate from the questionnaires containing my participant 
number and will be locked in a secure place. Only the researcher will be able to connect my 
name to my questionnaires, which will only occur if I am chosen and agree to participate in 
future research. If any publication results from this research, I would not be identified by 
name. 
3 .  There will be no anticipated personal risks or benefits because of my participation in this 
project, except the time to complete the survey and perhaps a heightened 
awareness/sensitivity to specific emotions, thoughts or behaviors. The benefit of my 
participation is that I will receive extra credit in my psychology course. 
4. My participation involves completing an 80-item questionnaire and answering those items 
by circling either true or false. It is estimated that the survey will take less than 1 hour. 
5 .  Approximately 400 people will take part in this study. The results will be used for the 
completion of a Master' s Thesis by the primary researcher. 
6. Data will be kept in a secure location in the faculty advisor' s laboratory where only the 
investigator and advisor wil l  have access to it. Data, consent forms, and contact information 
will be separated before they are stored and will be destroyed by shredding when the research 
has been accepted and approved. 
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I am 1 8  years of age or older. I have read and understand the above statements.  All my questions 
about my participation in this study have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate 
in the study realizing I may withdraw without penalty at any time during the survey process. 
Signing and returning the consent form and questionnaire indicates my consent to participate. 
If you have any questions you may contact: 
Primary researcher 
Rachel D ' Agostino, MA candidate 
Psychology Department 
 
Faculty Advisor 
Lori-Ann B. Forzano, Ph.D 
Psychology Department 
 
IRB Administrator 
Colleen Donaldson 
6th Floor Allen Administration Building 
 
PRINT 
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Appendix I 
Screening Debriefing to be Handed out 
This study was designed to examine different personality traits among college students. Some 
items asked you about personal characteristics, others asked you about your experience of 
emotions, interactions with others or behaviors you engage in. 
Though your individual results on the questionnaire cannot be disclosed, please feel free to 
contact the following people or services if you have concerns about your answers to any items on 
the questionnaire you just completed. 
Primary Researcher 
Rachel D '  Agostino, MA candidate 
Email : Rdago 1 @brockport. edu 
Phone:  
Faculty Advisor 
Lori-Ann B .  Forzano, Ph.D 
Psychology Department 
 
Brockport Counseling Center 
Location: Hazen Hall 
Email : askacounselor@brockport. edu 
Phone: (585)  395-2207 
Website : www .brockport.edu/cc/ 
Hours : Mon-Fri 8am-5pm 
Life Line 
24 hours/day at 275-5 1 5 1  
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Hello, is (Full 
Appendix J 
Phone Script for PSH 1 1 0 
----------------- available? Hello (first 
this is Rachel D' Agostino, the primary researcher for the study on personality traits that you 
completed a few weeks ago for research credit for PSH 1 1 0. You indicated then that you were 
interested in being contacted for future research in which you would earn an additional 1 
research credit for psych 1 10 .  I am calling to give you more information to see if you are still 
interested in participating in another study that is part of my Master's Thesis. 
The current study is examining personality traits, perception of stimuli, and decision 
making. It will require you to come to Holmes Hall room 1 1 2 for a session lasting no more than 
one hour. You will be required to fill out a questionnaire and complete three short tasks on the 
computer. Are you interested in signing up to participate? 
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Appendix K 
Phone Script for Other Psychology Course 
Hello, is (Full Name) ________ available? Hello (first name) ____ , this is 
Rachel D'  Agostino, the primary researcher for the study on personality traits that you completed 
a few weeks ago for extra credit for your (specific course) ____ psychology course. You 
indicated then that you were interested in being contacted for future research in which you would 
earn additional extra credit for your psychology course. I am calling to give you more 
information to see if you are still interested in participating in another study that is part of my 
Master' s Thesis. 
The current study is examining personality traits, perception of stimuli, and decision 
making. It will require you to come to Holmes Hall room 1 12 for a session lasting no more than 
one hour. You will be required to fill out a questionnaire and complete three short tasks on the 
computer. Are you interested in signing up to participate? 
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Appendix L 
Laboratory Session Consent Form for PSH 1 10 
STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT 
The purpose of this research project is to examine personality traits and decision making among 
college students. Four areas will be studied including personality characteristics, perception of 
stimuli, decisions regarding money and decisions regarding social situations. This research 
project is also being conducted in order for Rachel D'  Agostino to complete a Master' s Thesis  for 
the Department ofPsychology at the College at Brockport State University ofNew York 
In order to participate in this study, your informed consent is required. You are being asked to 
make a decision whether or not to participate in the proj ect. If you want to participate in the 
project, and agree with the statements below, please sign your name in the space provided at the 
end. You may change your mind at any time and leave the study without penalty, even after the 
study has begun. 
I understand that : 
1 .  My participation is voluntary, I have the right to refuse to answer any questions, and I 
may choose to end my participation at any time.  Nonparticipation or discontinuation of 
participation will have no impact on my grades in PSH 1 1 0. 
2 .  My confidentiality is guaranteed. The consent form containing my name will be kept 
separate from the questionnaire. My name will not be connected to my data. If any 
publication results from this research, I would not be identified by name. 
3 .  There will be no anticipated personal risks or benefits because of my participation in this 
project, except the time it takes to complete all tasks and perhaps a heightened 
awareness/sensitivity to specific emotions, thoughts or behaviors. The benefit of my 
participation is that I will receive 1 research credit in the PSH 1 1 0 course. 
4 .  My participation involves completing a 30-item questionnaire and answering those items 
by shading in the circle that indicates the response that best describes me. It is estimated that 
the questionnaire will take no more than minutes. I will also be asked to complete 3 
different tasks on the computer which involve using a keyboard to indicate my decision 
regarding different stimuli or scenarios. It is estimated that all 3 tasks will take no more than 
40 minutes to complete. 
5 .  Approximately 40 people will take part in this study. The results will be used for the 
completion of a Master' s Thesis by the primary research. 
6. Data will be kept in a secure location in the faculty advisor' s office where only the 
investigator and advisor will have access to it. Data and consent forms will be separated 
before they are stored. Consent forms will be shredded once the study is  complete, while 
data without identifying information will be stored for up to 7 years. 
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I am 1 8  years of age or older. I have read and understand the above statements. All my questions 
about my participation in this study have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate 
in the study realizing I may withdraw without penalty at any time during the survey process. 
Signing and returning the consent form and questionnaire indicates my consent to participate. 
If you have any questions you may contact: 
Primary researcher 
Rachel D'  Agostino, MA candidate 
Psychology Department 
 
Faculty Advisor 
Lori-Ann B .  Forzano, Ph.D 
Psychology Department 
 
IRB Administrator 
Colleen Donaldson 
6th Floor Allen Administration Building 
 
PRINT name: -------------------------------------------------------------
Date: ------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix M 
Laboratory Session Consent Form for Other Psychology courses 
STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT 
The purpose of this research project is to examine personality traits and decision making among 
college students. Four areas will be studied including personality characteristics, perception of 
stimuli, decisions regarding money and decisions regarding social situations. This research 
project is also being conducted in order for Rachel D '  Agostino to complete a Master' s Thesis for 
the Department of Psychology at the College at Brockport State University ofNew York 
In order to participate in this study, your informed consent is required. You are being asked to 
make a decision whether or not to participate in the project. If you want to participate in the 
project, and agree with the statements below, please sign your name in the space provided at the 
end. You may change your mind at any time and leave the study without penalty, even after the 
study has begun. 
I understand that: 
1 .  My participation is voluntary, I have the right to refuse to answer any questions, and I 
may choose to end my participation at any time. Nonparticipation or discontinuation of 
participation will have no impact on my grades in the psychology course for which I am 
completing this  study. 
2. My confidentiality is guaranteed. The consent form containing my name will be kept 
separate from the questionnaire. My name will not be connected to my data. If any 
publication results from this research, I would not be identified by name. 
3 .  will be no anticipated personal or benefits because of participation in this 
project, except the time it takes to complete all tasks and perhaps a heightened 
awareness/sensitivity to specific emotions, thoughts or behaviors. The benefit of my 
participation is that I will receive extra credit my psychology course. 
4. My participation involves completing a 3 0-item questionnaire and answering those items 
by shading in the circle that indicates the response that best describes me. It is estimated that 
the questionnaire will take no more than 1 5  minutes. I will also be asked to complete 3 
different tasks on the computer which involve using a keyboard to indicate my decision 
regarding different stimuli or scenarios. It is estimated that all 3 tasks will take no more than 
40 minutes to complete. 
5 .  Approximately 40 people will take part in this study. The results will be used for the 
completion of a Master' s Thesis by the primary research. 
6. Data will be kept in a secure location in the faculty advisor' s office where only the 
investigator and advisor will have access to it. Data and consent forms will be separated 
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before they are stored. Consent forms will be shredded once the study is  complete, while 
data without identifying information will be stored for up to 7 years. 
I am 1 8  years of age or older. I have read and understand the above statements. All my questions 
about my participation in this study have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate 
in the study realizing I may withdraw without penalty at any time during the survey process. 
Signing and returning the consent form and questionnaire indicates my consent to participate. 
If you have any questions you may contact: 
Primary researcher 
Rachel D '  Agostino, MA candidate 
Psychology Department 
 
Faculty Advisor 
Lori-Ann B .  Forzano, Ph.D 
Psychology Department 
 
IRB Administrator 
Colleen Donaldson 
6th Floor Allen Administration Building 
 
PRINT 
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Appendix N 
Indication of Person for Social Delay Discounting 
Think of all the important people in your life.  Out of all of those people, who do you most enjoy 
spending your free time with? Though this may be a difficult question, choose one person, think 
of this person' s  name, and picture them in your head. On the lines below, please write this 
person' s  relationship to you (e.g. best friend, girlfriend, boyfriend, mother, father etc.), as well as 
why you enjoy spending your free time with this person. Please do not indicate their name on 
this sheet. 
I most like spending time with my: ---------------------" 
because: -----------------------------------------------
Throughout the following computer task, please answer the questions while thinking of the one 
person who you've indicated above. 
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Appendix 0 
Verbal Laboratory Debriefing 
This study was designed to examine personality traits and risk taking behavior among college 
students. We examined your ability to inhibit responses when shown specific stimuli, as well as 
your decision making in the context of monetary and social rewards. We also assessed your self­
reported levels of risk taking. Your individual results to any questionnaires or computer tasks 
included in this study cannot be disclosed. 
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Appendix P 
Laboratory Debriefing to be Handed out 
If you have any concerns about your responses or behaviors during this study, please feel free to 
contact the following people or services. 
Primary Researcher 
Rachel D '  Agostino, MA candidate 
Email : Rdago 1 @brockport.edu 
Phone:  
Faculty Advisor 
Lori-Ann B .  Forzano, Ph.D 
Psychology Department 
 
Brockport Counseling Center 
Location: Hazen Hall 
Email : askacounselor@brockport. edu 
Phone : (585)  395-2207 
Website: www.brockport. edu/cc/ 
Hours : Mon-Fri 8am-5pm 
Life Line 
24 hours/day at 275-5 1 5 1  
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